195 



Military factors presented a second category of obstacles. The treaty 

 would limit an activity related to atomic weapons on which was based 

 the military strength of the United States. The weighty importance 

 of this subject demanded most careful deliberation. Those who 

 assigned paramountcy to overwhelming military superiority over a 

 potential adversary would brook no inhibition upon methods of achiev- 

 ing it. Those who believed the treaty gave an adversary unequal oppor- 

 tunities for increasing his militarv'- strength might also with reason 

 oppose it. The military strength of the United States relative to that 

 of the U.S.S.R. was itself in question, on the basis of assertions as to 

 the unreliability of U.S. intelligence estimates.^ Further uncertainties 

 were imposed by the security classification of military and technical 

 information relevant to the issue.'^ 



The third category of obstacles, in the area of science and technology, 

 somewhat overlapped the military area of concern — with particular 

 reference to uncertainties as to the capability of the adversary, tech- 

 nical questions as to the precise limitations resulting from the treaty, 

 and questions as to the relative effect of these inhibitions upon both 

 side,s. Opposition also lay in the cherished belief that science knew no 

 limits, and that no treaty should be permitted to constrain the freedom 

 of science. There were also obstacles inherent in the uncertainty as to 

 the importance of the hazard of radioactive fallout and in the un- 

 familiar nature of the field of nuclear science generally.* 



The fourth category of obstacles involved various aspects of the 

 adversary relationship between the United Staters and the U.S.S.R. It 

 was almost an act of faith to believe that the Soviet Union was fixed 

 and unchanging in its determination to destroy the United States and 

 its system of organization, and that accordingly any treaty beneficial 

 to the U.S.S.R. was automatically disadvantageous to the United 

 States.^ The So^^et Union could not be trusted." Only by some form of 

 verifying inspection could the United States safely enter into an agree- 

 ment with the U.S.S.R. on a matter of such gravity.^^ 



With respect to the fifth category, although public opinion was not 

 opposed to approval of the treaty, yet in two respects public opinion did 

 constitute an obstacle. One was that the public opinion, as measured 



'Senator Margaret Chase Smith (Republican, of Maine), who later voted against the 

 treaty, complained : "I am disappointed in the suggestion made by some proponents of 

 the treaty that the only way in which the appropriate data can be acquired is to engage 

 in an all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union" (Congressional Record (Sept. 20. 196.3), 

 p. 16740). Senator Smith had reference to the "widespread conflict of opinion and dis- 

 agreement among the military specialists and nuclear scientists over the probable military 

 consequences to us if the treaty is ratified." 



7 See p. 229. See also p. 196, footnote 13. 



8 The hearings and interim report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of 

 the Senate Armed Services Committee, chaired by John Stennis (Democrat, of Mississippi), 

 dealt extensively with the military and scientific factors. See pt. IV. 



» Senator .7. William Fulbright (Democrat, of Arkansas), chairman of the Foreign Rela- 

 tions Committee, in his book "Old Myths and New Realities" (New York, Random House, 

 1964), discusses this point at some length in specific reference to the test ban treaty. 

 He observed : "The attribution of an unalterable will and constancy to Soviet policy has 

 been a serious handicap to our own policy" (p. 60). Also, "A stigma of heresy has been 

 attached to suggestions by American policymakers that Soviet policy can change or that 

 it is sometimes altered in response to our own." (Idem.) 



^0 In the words of Senator Harry F. Byrd (Democrat, of Virginia), "There is nothing 

 in Soviet history which would serve as a basis for faith that the Kremlin would enter 

 into a treaty with us at this time and keep it if they did not think it would serve their 

 objectives to our disadvantage" (Congressional Record (Sept. 19, 196.3), p. 16650). 



" In the words of Senator Smith : "A sound posture on arms control and disarmament 

 must be based on a strong on-site Inspection control." In a letter to the author, Sept. 2, 

 1964. 



