196 



in the polls, was profoundly mistrustful of the Soviet Union.^^ The 

 other was that the communications received by Members of the Senate 

 urging approval of the treaty tended to be couched in excessively emo- 

 tional language and to support the treaty almost entirely on the basis 

 of the fear of fallout, which testimony had not authenticated tech- 

 nically as an issue. This apparent attitude of the public led some op- 

 ponents of the treaty to conclude that if possessed of the more substan- 

 tive facts about the effects of the treaty, the public might have re- 

 versed its verdict." Kelated to the general question of public opinion is 

 the question of whether the adoption of the treaty might induce a re- 

 laxation of vigilance against the threat of Communist expansion. This 

 concern, which General Maxwell discussed under the term of "eupho- 

 ria" a,s a long-term threat to sustained military preparedness, caused 

 anxiety also among Members of the Senate.^* 



Considerations favoring apj/roval of the treaty 



In each of these 5 areas, however, there seem to have been counter- 

 vailing factors that satisfied an adequate majority of Senators that 

 the treaty could be safely and wisely approved. Thus, in respect to the 

 political role of the Senate, the long history of consultations with the 

 Senate by the administration before and during the negotiations, the 

 respectful tone of the President's statements and communications on 

 the subject of the treaty as he strove to build nonpartisan support for 

 it, and perhaps also the political acceptance by the Senate itself of the 

 Russell amendment, gave reassurance that senatorial prerogatives 

 were duly preserved and acknowledged. 



The assertedly adverse military aspects of the treaty were most 

 strongly stressed by the leading opponents of the treaty. Yet there 

 were important military points in favor of the treaty, such as the 

 authoritative opinion expressed by the Secretary of Defense that the 

 treaty would prolong the existence of U.S. technological superiority 

 and obstruct nuclear proliferation.^^ Of great importance was the 

 support given the treaty by the witnesses representing the Depart- 

 ment of Defense, and especially by the Chairman and members of the 

 Joint Chiefs of Staff." The fact that this approval was explicitly 



'2 One article on this subject, by Sidney Draus with Reuben Mehling and Elaine El-Assal, 

 "Mass Media and the Fallout Controversy," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVII, No. 2 (Sum- 

 mer, 1963). pp. 191-205. concludes from an examination of a population of 2."6 persons that 

 (p. 205) "Radioactive fallout itself is preceived as so devastating that when in addition 

 there is a basic conflict among the scientists to whom one looks for authoritative clarifica- 

 tion, it is small wonder that no reduction of anxiety was found despite Ivnowledge, media 

 exposure, etc." Another studv, bv Hazel Gaudet Erskine, "The Polls : Atomic Weapons and 

 Nuclear Energy," Public Opinion Quarterly. XXVII, No. 2 (Summer, 196.3). pp. 155-190, 

 noted that (at the public seemed reluctant to endorse atmospheric testing, even after the 

 Soviet Union resumed it, (6) that women were more concerned with fallout than men were, 

 (c) that under President Kennedy's administration. Democrats were slightly more opposed 

 to tests than were Republicans, but that (f?) public attitudes were conditioned by a deep 

 suspicion of the Soviet Union. 



1^ In a letter to the author, Sept. 2, 1964, Senator Stennis wrote : "I am reasonably confi- 

 dent that the public in general did not have a full appreciation of the technical and military 

 problems involved in the consideration of the treaty. Even in the most favorable circum- 

 stances it is impossible to convey to the public adequate information which will provide for 

 a full understanding of a subject as complex as this. The problems involving security classi- 

 fication made this situation more diflScult." 



"For example. Senator Wallace F. Bennett (Republican, of Utah), told the Senate that 

 the "greatest risk the treaty will create is the eitect it will have on our attitude. In the end, 

 our hope for peace may actually be set back. We are being warned against 'euphoria,' but 

 that Is only a pleasant sounding word which few people understand. Even before the treaty 

 has been approved, words are being written and spoken about the great relief we will feel. 

 We are being encouraged to make plans to spend, on peaceful programs, the money we are 

 told will be saved because of the relaxed tensions." (Congressional Record (Sept. 23, 1963), 

 p. 16844.) 



15 Soe footnote 12. 



i« See pp. 213-215. 



