197 



conditioned on specific safeguards, which the Preparedness Investi- 

 gating Subcommittee endorsed for implementation, and on wliich 

 administration action was vigorously initiated even before the treaty 

 was reported out of committee, lent weight and substance to the 

 approval of the senior military ofScers.^^ 



The scientific and technical obstacles to approval were countered 

 by assertions as to the marginal value of further atmospheric tests, 

 assurances as to the continuing utility of underground tests, and 

 explanations that progress toward goals deemed important in military 

 technology did not require tests at all.^^ Science, a preponderance of 

 technical witnesses maintained, had significant limitations in the 

 development of both offeiisive and defensive weaponry. 



Factors favorable to the treaty were of 2 general kinds : One had to 

 do with the mutual benefits ito both the United States and the 

 U.S.S.R. ; and the other concerned ways in which the treaty was con- 

 sidered to benefit the United States at the expense of the Soviet Union. 

 Of mutual advantage were the reduction of tension, control over pro- 

 liferation of nuclear weapons to other States, the slowing of the arms 

 race, reduction of radioactive fallout, and establishment of a basis for 

 further arms negotiation.^^ Inferred as of benefit to the United States 

 were the expectations that the treaty would promote a division between 

 the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist regime, and encourage 

 pluralism within the Soviet Union itself. -° 



Mention has already been made of the fact that the fifth category 

 of obstacles — in the area of public opinion — was essentially indirect, 

 with the direct effect being in favor of adoption of the treaty. In the 

 eyes of the general public, the overriding issue appeared to be that of 

 radioactive fallout and the hope that the treaty would eliminate this 

 threat. Other notable advantages were considered to be the lessening 

 of tensions, slowing of the arms race, reduction in the possibility of 

 atomic warfare, reduction in the costs of military preparedness, and 

 progi-ess toward disarmament.^^ 



Apart from the question as to whether or not the limited nuclear 

 test ban treaty was generally desirable to both the United States and 

 the U.S.S.R., it is possible that both its substantive benefits and the 

 military risks were overstated.^^ Nevertheless, the treaty contributed 

 a number of positive gains. In its effect on the public in the United 

 States, the treaty undoubtedly reduced both the existence and the fear 

 of radioactive fallout. Senate consideration of the issues surrounding 



" Speaking in favor of the treaty, and on the subject of these safeguards, Senator Henry 

 M. Jackson (Democrat, of Washington) said : "In light of the testimony that has been 

 given and the understandings that have been reached with respect to the policy of the 

 administration In safeguarding the national interest ♦ * * i believe that the Senate may 

 prudently give its advice and consent to ratification." (Congressional Record (Sept. 13, 

 1963). p. 16082.) 



IS The testimony of Dr. Harold Brown. Director of Defense Research and Engineering, 

 before both the hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee and the Preparedness 

 Investigating Subcommittee was especially telling on these matters. (See p. 217.) 



i« See pp. 20S-209. 



20 On this point see U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. "Report on 

 the Nuclear Test Ban Treatv," on Exeeiitlve M, S8th Cong., 1st sess.. Executive Report 

 No. 3, Sept. 3, 1963 (Washington, U,S. Government Printing Office, 1963). pp. 25-26. 



21 See page 196n. However, in his letter to the author. Senator Stennis wrote: "Most 

 of m.v mail indicated only a superficial knowledge of the issue — militarily, politically, 

 or scientifically." 



^ In a discussion with the author, Feb, 10, 1965, Urie Bronfenbrenner gave it as his 

 experience that citizens of the Soviet T^nion assigned greater beneficial significance to 

 the treaty than did U.S. citizens. Professor Bronfenbrenner, a social psychologist at 

 Cornell University, has been a frequent visitor to the Soviet Union in order to study 

 aspects of Soviet culture and mores. 



