199 



matter how complicated the issues and how wide the scope of the 

 effect of the treaty, the ultimate decision had to be "yea" or "nay" on 

 the question of consenting to the treaty — with or without some further 

 qualification that would also require a "yea" or "nay" vote. 



II, Background of the Issue 



President Kennedy's leadership was a major factor in persuading 

 the American people and the U.S. Senate to accept the limited nuclear 

 test ban treaty. From the moment of his accession to office, the Pres- 

 ident persistently searched for a way to curb nuclear tests, not only 

 because he considered a test ban desirable in itself but also because 

 he regarded it as the first step toward the larger objective of world 

 disarmament. 



Status of nuclear tests in 1961 



President Kennedy inherited from his predecessor a moratorium 

 on nuclear testing, by informal agreement with the Soviet Union, that 

 had prevailed since late in 1958. (However, see note, p. 200.) 

 For two years, negotiations to formalize the moratorium had failed 

 for want of agreement on a satisfactory means of verification. The 

 Soviet Union had also resisted an alternative American proposal to 

 ban atmospheric tests on the asserted principle that it would legiti- 

 matize tests excluded from the ban. The negotiations were also compli- 

 cated by various technical developments, one of which was the "big 

 hole" decoupling theory, which held that large underground nuclear 

 explosions could be successfully concealed from a remote seismic de- 

 tection system. This theory, propounded by Dr. Albert Latter of the 

 Rand Corp. in 1959, appears to have been confirmed by tests with high 

 explosives later in that year. 



President Kennedy's search for a test han agreement 



During his first year in office, President Kennedy made repeated 

 references to his wish to conclude a nuclear test ban treaty. In his 

 first message to Congress he declared : "It is our intention to resume 

 negotiations prepared to reach a final agreement with any nation that 

 is equally willing to agree to an effective and enforceable treaty." ^ On 

 sending Ambassador A. H. Dean to Geneva, March 14. 1961. as head 

 of the United States delegation to the Conference on the Discontinuance 

 of Nuclear Tests, the President expressed a hope that new test ban 

 proposals the delegation were to take with them "will be accepted and 

 that the negotiators will be able to proceed with all appropriate speed 

 toward the conclusion of the first international arms control agree- 

 ments in the nuclear age." ^ In his message to the Congress, May 25, 

 on "Urgent National Needs," he described a treaty banning nuclear 

 tests as the "first significant but essential step on the road to disarma- 

 ment." " Other expressions of his intense concern to achieve a test ban 

 agreement were contained in a diplomatic letter to President Sukarno 

 of Indonesia and President Keita of Mali,'^ in an address before the 

 United Nations General Assembly," in a joint communication with 



23 state of the Union message, Jan. 30, 1961, reproduced in "Documents on Disarma- 

 ment, 1961," p. 19. 

 « Ibid., pp. 33-34. 

 »Ibid.. p. 1.58. 

 2« Ibid., of Sept. 13, p. 427. 

 '^ Ibid., of Sept. 25, pp. 469-470. 



