200 



Prime Minister Nehru of India,^^ and somewhat more extensively in an 

 interview with editor Adzhubei of Isvestiya (who was also Premier 

 Khrushchev's son-in-law) at which he remarked that "one of the first 

 things that I did on becoming President was to commit the United 

 States to an earnest effort to achieve a satisfactory agreement with 

 the Soviet Union on the cessation of nuclear tests." He went on : 



I had hoped that this would be one area where we could make real progress. 

 It would lessen the contamination of the air, it would be a first step towards 

 disarmament, and I felt that if we could achieve an agreement in this area, 

 we could then move on to the other areas of disarmament which required 

 action.** 



The foregoing are no more than an illustrative sampling of the 

 President's numerous expressions in favor of a test ban treaty. How- 

 ever, two events occurred that postponed achievement of agreement on 

 this matter until the final months of his tragically abbreviated tenn of 

 office. The first was resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union ; 

 the second was the Cuban crisis of October 1962. 



Collapse of the test moratoHum 



Wlien the Soviet Union, August 30, 1961, abruptly announced re- 

 sumption of nuclear tests,"" the President with Prime Minister Harold 

 Macmillan of the United Kingdom offered a proposal to Premier 

 Khrushchev "that their three governments agree, effective immediately, 

 not to conduct nuclear tests which take place in the atmosphere and 

 produce radioactive fallout." *" (Such tests would be self -revealing and 

 would require no elaborate detection apparatus or the other complica- 

 tions of onsite inspections.) When Premier Khrushchev rejected the 

 proposal, September 9, the President and Prime Minister reaffirm.ed 

 "the readiness of the United States and the United Kingdom to nen;o- 

 tiate a controlled nuclear test ban agreement of the widest possible 

 scope." " 



President Kennedy reacted to the continuing series of Soviet nuclear 

 tests, late in 1961; he indicated, November 2, that the United States 

 was assessing the technical importance of the Soviet tests and might 

 need to resume atmospheric tests, also. Nevertheless, he said, "We will 

 continue to be ready to sign the nuclear test treaty which provides for 

 adequate inspection and control." ^^ His position'was echoed, Novem- 

 ber 8, In^ an urgent appeal in a TTnited Nations General Assembly 

 resolution for the conclusion of a test ban treaty among the nuclear 

 powers.^* 



28 Ibifl.. of Nov. 9. p. ,584. 



=9 Ibid., p. 650. 



''•<' Both the abruptness of the announcement and the fact that the Soviet Union exploded 

 from 30 to 50 nuclear devices in tests during the rest of 1961 were later to occasion deep 

 disapproval bv Members of the Senate, who considered these actions as a form of "surprise 

 abrogation." The elaborateness of the Soviet test sequence veas also interpreted (probably 

 with justice) as evidence that the Soviet Union had planned the termination of thp mora- 

 torium long in advance, during the period while Soviet negotiators were exchanging test 

 ban proposals with the other national delegations to the Eighteen Nation Disarmnment 

 Committee at Geneva. This too w.ns taken as an evidence of the Soviet Union's bod faith. 

 FTowever, it should also be noted that the moratorium had been terminated ns of Doc. .^1. 

 1959. by President Eisenhower in a White House press release. Dec. 29. Thus, the 

 "moratorium" Inherited by President Kenned.v was rie facto but not by either explicit 

 agreement or unilateral declaration. Wliile considering the United States "free to 

 resume weapons testing," the President promised that resumption would not take place 

 without advance notice. The United States would also continue its "active program of 

 weapon research, development and laboratorv-tvpe experimentation" ("Documents on 

 Disarmament. 1945-59." II. pp. 1590-1591K 



••'1 "Documents on Disarmament, 1961," p. 351. 



=2 Ibid., p. 404. 



'3 Ibid., p. 567. 



s«Ibid., p. 578. 



