201 



Tlie Soviet Union issued a statement in connection with the resump- 

 tion of the Geneva negotiations, November 28, 1961, in which some- 

 thing quite similar to the test ban treaty of 1963 was proposed. It 

 was a proposal — 



* * * To conclude immediately an appropriate agreement on the discontinuance 

 of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space [italic in the 

 original], tliat is, in these environments where the implementation of control is 

 not fraught with any serious technical difficulties.^ 



The Soviet proposal was accompanied by a draft agi'eement that pro- 

 posed a voluntai*y uninspected moratorium on underground tests until 

 a system of control could be agreed upon. (The Soviet proposal was 

 accordingly denounced by Ambassador Dean, who assailed the "sheer 

 effronteiy" and "colossal hyprocrisy" of the Soviet Union in making 

 the proposal in view of that nation's pledge of August 28, 1959, "never 

 to be the first to revSume nuclear weapons tests, * * *" and the breach 

 of tliis pledge in September 1961.) ^° 



hnpetus to detente after Cuban missile crisis 



Discussions throughout 1962 and up to April of 1963 on the cessation 

 of nuclear tests centered upon the negotiation of a comprehensive ban 

 treaty that would provide an inspection arrangement affording an 

 acceptable minimum of assurance to the United States that the Soviet 

 Union was not evading it, and at the same time requiring minimum 

 invasion of the cherished national privacy of the Soviet Union. Prog- 

 ress in the negotiations was interrupted, however, in early autumn 

 of 1962, by the Cuban crisis over the sending of Soviet nuclear missiles, 

 troops and military technicians to support the Castro government. The 

 dangerous level of tension produced by this confrontation of nuclear 

 powers was followed in 1963 by an opposite reaction. Premier Khru- 

 shchev later told Xorman Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review and 

 an official of SANE, that "after Cuba" he considered the opportunity 

 for more cordial relations between the United States and the Soviet 

 Union was improved. 



The one area on which I thought we were closest to agreement was nuclear 

 testing [said Khrushchev], and so I went before the Council of Ministers and 

 said to them : 



"We can have an agreement with the United States to stop nuclear tests if we 

 agree to three inspections. I know that three inspections are not necessary, and 

 that the policing can be done adequately from outside our borders. But the 

 American Congress has convinced itself that onsite inspection is necessary and 

 the President cannot get a treaty through the Senate without it. Very well, then, 

 let us accommodate the President." 



The Council asked me if I was certain that we could have a treaty if we agreed 

 to three insjiections and I told them yes. Finally, I persuaded them.*' 



The offer referred to by the Premier in his talk with Cousins had 

 been made in a letter to President Kennedy, December 19, 1962, not 

 long after the easing of the Cuban crisis. It offered Soviet acceptance 

 of a comprehensive test ban treaty calling for three unmanned seismic 

 stations on Soviet soil and two or three onsite inspections of "suspi- 

 cious" earth tremors annually. Wrote Khrushchev : 



You and your representatives. Mr. President, refer to the fact that, without a 

 minimum number of onsite inspections, it would be impossible for you to persuade 



«5 Ibid., p. 662. 

 «« Ibid., pp. 665, 669. 



^Norman Cousins, "Notes on a 1963 Visit With Khrushchev," Saturday Review (Nov. 

 7. 1964), p. 21. 



