203 



the administration was prepared to seek.*^ The Kepublican Confer- 

 ence Committee on Nuclear Testing had reservations as to tlie desir- 

 ability of any test ban treaty. It is not surprising that the President 

 told his press conference, April 24, that "I am not overly sanguine 

 about prospects for an accord," that he told his press conference, May 

 8, 'T'm not hopeful, not hopeful," and that a sense of desperation 

 was evident in his press conference of May 22, when he said "We're 

 still hoping," but "unless we could get an agreement now, I would 

 think the chance of getting it would be comparatively slight." ^^ 



Indications of United States and Soviet Union detente 



Still the President persisted. On April 1, the United States and 

 United Kingdom jointly submitted a recapitulation of their position 

 on the essential features of a comprehensive test ban treaty to the 18- 

 Nation Disarmament Committee.** A mild thaw was occasioned by 

 the Soviet Union's acceptance, April 5, of the American proposal for 

 a direct teletype link between the two seats of government.*^ On a 

 less-formal level of negotiation, the President took advantage of a 

 planned visit with Premier Khrushchev, granted to Norman Cousins, 

 to ask the editor of the Saturday Review to explore the possibilities 

 for progress toward a test ban treaty privately. According to Cousins : 



President Kennedy, knowing I was to see the chairman, had asked me to try 

 to clarify the Soviet misunderstanding of the American position on the test ban. 

 If the chairman construed the American jwsition on inspections to mean that 

 we actually did not want a treaty banning such testing, then that interpretation 

 was in error.** 



In his interview with Cousins, Khrushchev complained that he 

 "was made to look foolish" before his Council of Ministers. He still 

 wanted a treaty. He felt he had been misled as to the position of the 

 United States. The Chinese, he said, had predicted that if he offered 

 the United States three inspections they would counter by demanding 

 six, and so on. Events had seemed to confirm the correctness of the 

 Chinese assessment : the United States did not want a test ban treaty. 

 However, Khrushchev concluded his phase of his conversation with 

 Cousins by saying : 



But you can tell the President I accept his explanation of an honest misunder- 

 standing and suggest that we get moving. But the next move is up to him.*' 



Responding to this invitation, the President joined with the Prime 

 Minister in a letter to Khrushchev "in an effort to see if we could 

 develop some means by which we could bring this matter to a climax 

 and see if we could reach an accord * * *."48 "\;\nien Khrushchev's 

 reply to this initiative was inconclusive, another joint proposal from 

 the Anglo-American Powers was delivered in Moscow, May 31.*^ 



*2 According to Earl H. Voss, in a study that appeared during the test ban hearings in 

 the summer of 1963 "The Joint Chiefs of Staff were reliably reported to have objected 

 to manv of the major concessions made by the United States in 1962—63," "Nuclear 

 Ambush, the Test Ban Trap" (Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1963), p. 484. 



*3 "Documents on Disarmament, 1963." pp. 181, 183, 194. 



** "Documents on Disarmament, 1963," p. 141. 



'^Ibid., p. 160. This was an agreement In principle. A detailed technical agreement was 

 signed between the two Governments June 20. 



*« Cousins, op. cit. 



" Ibid., p. 58. 



** President's news conference of Apr. 24, cited above. 



*» "A Chronology of Disarmament Developments, 1963," p. 8. 



