205 



factory provision for inspection would encounter serious opposition. 

 Nevertheless, the American team of negotiators that went to Moscow 

 in July carried instructions to seek, if possible, agreement on a com- 

 prehensive ban. Only when it became apparent that the Soviet Union 

 would not accept a comprehensive agreement with the requisite in- 

 spection provisions, did the American team turn to the limited ban as 

 an alternative. In this decision, the negotiators were guided both by 

 communications from the White House and from the British Govern- 

 ment, which was extremely anxious to complete an agreement of some 

 substantive nature.^" 



However, the outlook for the treaty in the Senate was still not 

 completely assured. Acquiescence was needed from those Senators who 

 placed heavy emphasis on military assessment of the consequences of 

 the treaty for the national security ; from those concerned with pro- 

 tecting the viability of U.S. research in nuclear science ; and from those 

 j)rimarily interested in the consequences of the treaty for the whole 

 edifice of American foreign policy. Support of Senate Republicans 

 was indispensable. On one hand, the President could rely on the favor- 

 able votes of those Senators most deeply anxious about radioactive 

 fallout, and from those most eager for progress toward ending the arms 

 race. On the other hand, the President could expect certain opposition 

 from those to whom almost any agreement with the Soviet Union 

 constituted softness. He could also expect opposition from those whose 

 concept of national security was exclusively in terms of overwhelming 

 military power. To achieve the necessary two-thirds vote, the President 

 needed to enlist the acceptance, if not the affirmative support, of the 

 Joint Chiefs of Staff. He needed the support of the atomic energy 

 community and the still broader scientific community; and of the 

 academic fraternity in the fields of international affairs and diplo- 

 mac}^ He assuredly needed a mobilization of public opinion at large. 



Completion of the negotiation process 



The negotiations themselves were handled smoothly, quickly, with 

 few complications. Effective direct communication was maintained 

 between the American negotiators and the White House throughout. 

 The device of having three "depositary governments" would enable 

 states not recognizing or recognized by one depositary to file acceptance 

 of the treaty with another. The question of inspection was eliminated 

 by excluding tests that could not be detected from outside of states. 

 The problem of distinguishing between weapons tests and experiments 

 in peaceful uses of atomic explosions was resolved, less happily, by 

 extending the ban to cover "any other atomic explosion" in the for- 

 bidden environments of air, space, and water. This expedient left a 

 loose end which was to be the subject of much discussion by the Senate 

 and which lingered as a point of uncertainty after the treaty was 

 ratified. 



The negotiators arrived in Moscow July 14. Discussions continued 

 from July 16 to July 25. The principals were W. Averell Harriman, 

 Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (United States) ; Lord 

 Hailsham, Lord President of the Council and Minister of Science 

 (United Kingdom) ; and A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs 



s^ This account Is based on the Interview already referred to with John McNaughton, 

 who went, as general counsel of the Department of Defense, as a member of the U.S. 

 negotiating team. 



