208 



ices (Chairman Eiissell, Stennis, Byrd of Virginia, Thurmond, Byrd 

 of West Virginia, Smitli and Goldwater), 3 of the 9 Senate mem- 

 bers of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (Russell, Bennett, and 

 Curtis) and 4 of the 7 members of the Preparedness Investi- 

 gating Subcommittee (Chairman Stennis, Thurmond, Smith and Gold- 

 water) opposed the treaty. There is at least some inference in the dift'er- 

 ences in divisions among the several committees that it reflected their 

 differential exposure to evidence regarding the treaty and its possible 

 consequences. 



Testimony of the Secretary of State 



In his brief opening statement to the Foreign Relations Committee 

 hearing. Secretary Rusk delineated the general plan of the treaty, 

 after explaining its historical backgromid. Like other witnesses who 

 followed him, he Stressed the decline in national security that accom- 

 panied the nuclear arms race. 



It is against this prospect, which the world must frankly face, that the Sen- 

 ate is asked to consider the present treaty. If there may be marginal risks In 

 it, they are far less in my opinion than the risks that will result if we accept 

 the thought that rational man must pursue an unlimited competition in nuclear 

 weapons. 



The Secretary noted that article I of the treaty contained the funda- 

 mental obligation — a prohibition of nuclear tests except underground. 

 He defined an "underground test" as one in which "the radioactive 

 debris remains within the country where the explosion takes place." 

 The treaty did not "affect the use of nuclear weapons in war." It 

 would, however, restrict nuclear explosions for peaceful pur- 

 l>oses as they would be indistinguishable from tests. Still, he con- 

 tended, much useful work could still be done on the Plowshare proj- 

 ect. Concerning article II of the treaty, he noted that the amendment 

 process involved a veto which he regarded "as essential to the security 

 interests of the United States." °* With respect to article III, providing 

 for "ratification and accession," he assured the committee that no 

 regime, by the act of subscribing to that treaty, would be able to 

 "gain recognition by parties to the treaty that do not now recognize 

 it." ^^ Article IV of the treaty entitled any signatory to withdraw 

 unilaterally, upon 3 months' notice. Said the Secretary : "Under the 

 treaty, we alone will decide whether extraordinary events have oc- 

 curred and whether they jeopardize our supreme national interests." 

 In such an event withdrawal under the 3 months clause might be 

 necessary. But if the Soviet Union started to test in violation of the 

 treaty, "the United States could, if it chose, consider itself released 

 from its reciprocal obligation and could resume testing without 

 delay." ^^ 



Secretaiy Rusk then identified "concrete gains" thalt the treaty 

 offered. These were : a slowing-down of the upward spiraling nuclear 

 arms race, an inliibition upon the proliferation of nuclear weapons 



«3 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 

 Hearings on Ex. M, SStli Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 

 1963), p. 13. Tlie treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in tlie atmosphere, in outer space, 

 and underwater, signed at Moscow on Aug. 5, 1963, on behalf of the United States of 

 America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of 

 Soviet Socialist Republics. 



84 Ibid. 



05 Ibid., p. 14. 



e« Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Hearings, op. clt., p. 18. 



