209 



to additional countries, and a reduction in ''radioactive pollution of 

 the planet." But the most important advantage of the treaty was 

 what it might symbolize. 



* * * If the promise of this treaty can be realized, if we can now take even 

 this one small step along a new course, then frail and fearful mankind may find 

 another step and another until confidence replaces terror and hope takes over 

 from despair."" 



As to the proposition that the Soviet Union was not to be trusted, 

 he replied that he did not believe "an agreement of this sort can rest 

 upon the element of faith and trust." Fortunately, he said, "We will 

 know if there are significant violations of this treaty, we will be free 

 to do whatever is necessary in our own security, and I would think 

 that this is not a matter of trust." *^^ He added that the withdrawal 

 clause had been written into the treaty at the request of the United 

 States: the Soviet Union did not require one "simply on the thesis 

 that sovereignty permits the denunciation of a treaty in any event." 



The question of the "minimum deterrent" versus "superior strategic 

 force" was raised by Senator Jackson, who asked whether Secretary 

 Eusk believed the United States could afford a position of "parity or 

 equality with the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons technology and 

 systems ?" The Secretary replied : 



Senator, I believe that the United States must maintain overall nuclear 

 superiority with respect to the Soviet Union. This involves primarily the capacity 

 to demonstrate that regardless of who strikes first, the United States will be in 

 a position effectively to destroy an aggressor.* 



A point of major importance was as to the role of the Department 

 of Defense in the formulation of foreign policy. The issue was first 

 raised by Senator Stennis who noted that no military adviser had 

 participated in the treaty negotiations. This was "just unthinkable" 

 to Stennis who asked : "Why did you not take someone or send some- 

 one?"^° On the other hand, Senator Morse invited the Secretary to 

 clarify the relationship of the Department of Defense to treatymaking, 

 and expressed gratification "that you did not take a member of the 

 Joint Chiefs of Staff to Moscow, for, I think, the symbolism of it 

 would have been most unfortunate." The Secretary explained that 

 although i^articipation in the actual negotiation was the function of the 

 Secretary of State under the direction of the President, nevertheless — 



The Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by statute, have re- 

 sponsibility both for advice and action in the security field and, necessarily, 

 security and foreign policy tend to merge in very important respects, so I think, 

 perhaps. Senator Morse, this division could not be made completely mutually ex- 

 clusive here on this particular point. "^ 



In concluding, the Secretary said the President had given Under- 

 Secretary Harriman daily instructions during the negotiation of the 

 treaty, and the President had the "benefit of the full advice of the 

 Joint Chiefs of Staff before giving such direction." He did not believe 

 that there had been any change in the purpose of the Communist 

 movement, "whether in the Soviet Union or in mainland China, or 

 anywhere else, to communize the rest of the world." He agreed that it 

 was a difficult problem to try to move toward an important act of 



8' Ibid., p. 20. 



^ Ibid., pp. 26-27. 



«» Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Hearings, op. cit., p. 45. 



TO Ibid., p. 42. 



■" Ibid., p. 57. 



99-044—69 15 



