210 



peace while remaining mindful of the hazards remaining. And he 

 offered a note of hope to Chairman Fulbright : 



I think that there is steadily developing in the Soviet Union something 

 roughly comparable to a public opinion. The question is whether it will develop 

 fast enough to have a decisive influence on policy in great matters of crisis, but 

 I think there is no doubt that there is a strong demand in the Soviet Union for 

 attention to some of these great unfinished tasks of their own society, just as 

 there is here in our country.''^ 



Testimony of the Secretary of Defense 



The second witness, Eobert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, 

 dealt with military areas in which he judged the treaty to be advan- 

 tageous or disadvantageous to the United States. The Secretary con- 

 cluded that on balance the military effect of the treaty favored the 

 United States. He recalled that he had earlier testified that "the 

 United States has nuclear superiority." Military strength had also 

 been increased in the sub-nuclear categories. 



I mention this strength [said McNamara] because I regard as essential to our 

 national security the maintenance of a military posture such that we can absorb 

 any initial surprise attack and strike back with sufficient power to destroy the 

 aggressor. My assessment of the proposed treaty is made from that point of 

 view — from the point of view of what is best for the security of the United 

 States.'" 



The Secretary then took up four areas of concern. In the first of 

 these, concerning high-yield (tens of megatons) weapons, the Soviet 

 Union appeared to be teclmologically superior to the United States, 

 as measured by the standard of yield-to-weight ratio. The treaty would 

 preclude further developments in this area. However, "the apparent 

 Soviet teclmological advantage at the upper end of the yield spectrum 

 has resulted from a considered decision by the United States not to 

 concentrate effort in this field * * *." 



In intermediate and low-yield nuclear weapons, the United States 

 "appears to be clearly superior in yield-to-weight ratios." This supe- 

 riority enabled the United States to develop and deploy large 

 numbers of long-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles; to 

 develop "relatively small warheads wliich would be used to assure 

 penetration by saturation of sophisticated and very elaborate ballistic 

 missile defenses;" to achieve such desirable characteristics of missiles 

 as dispersal, mobility, and hardening; to equip missiles with decoys; 

 to achieve salvo launches ; and possibly to arm a future ABM."* 



The Secretary questioned the military effectiveness of very high- 

 yield weapons because it was difficult and costly to give them the 

 desirable military characteristics he had ascribed to the smaller-yield 

 weapons of the United States. Several small weapons, directed at 

 military targets, he said, "can achieve a higher confidence of kill" so 

 that "for a given resource input we achieve higher target destruction 

 with our smaller systems." '^ 



The second area of concern was the survivability of the deterrent 

 system of the United States. Here, the U.S. position was secure. "Our 

 missile force is deployed so as to assure that under any conceivable 

 Soviet first strike, a substantial portion of it would remain in firing 

 condition." He was satisfied with the extent of hardening of Minute- 



''aibid., pp. 59-79. 

 '3 Ibid., p. 98. 

 ■^^ Ibid., pp. 99-100. 

 ^5 Ibid., p. 101. 



