211 



man missiles and command/control facilities; also, many Polaris sub- 

 marines at sea, and strategic aircraft aloft or dispersed, would survive 

 a first strike.'^ 



As to the third area, the anti-ballistic-missile system, or ABM, he 

 did not judge the Soviet Union to hold any advantage. 



The ABM system which we are now designing will provide us with a high 

 confidence of achieving a low miss distance, a short distance between intercept- 

 ing missile and the incoming warhead. At such miss distances, the ABM war- 

 head designs which we now have or can develop through underground testing 

 will provide a high probability of killing Soviet warheads even if they incor- 

 porate advanced technology far beyond what now exists. 



In the other required characteristics of an ABM system — reaction 

 speed, missile performance in accelerating, traffic handling capacity,^ 

 and capacity for decoy discrimination — further progi'ess was domi- 

 nated by factors unrelated to nuclear testing. 



With respect to his fourth area of concern, the Secretary said that 

 U.S. weapons "have and will continue to have'" capability to pene- 

 trate enemv defenses. There were some marmnal uncertainties. Vul- 

 nerability of an incoming warhead to the blast effect of an exploding 

 AB]M warhead could not be fully tested underground. Also, "We have 

 not, and we believe that the Soviet Union has not, explored by full- 

 scale high altitude tests the vulnerability of reenti-y vehicles to "blast." 



But. regardless of the design of any Soviet ABM system, in view of the war- 

 head improvements w^e can make under the treaty, of the massive U.S. force 

 available to saturate their defenses, and of the array of penetration aids 'which 

 are being developed and will continue to be developed and improved, by under- 

 ground testing where necessary, the United States will continue to have the 

 capability, and most importantly, the Soviets will know that we will continue 

 to have the capability — to penetrate and to devastate the Soviet Union if a re- 

 taliatory blow is required." 



The Secretary next examined the possibility of Soviet "cheating" 

 by means of clandestine tests, concluding that such "would clearly 

 not be a simple, easily concealed, high-confidence operation." To deter 

 surprise abrogation, it would be "firm national policy" to retain a 

 "readiness to test in every relevant environment." '^^ 



In conclusion, the Secretary summarized the military advantages 

 of the treaty as "retarding the spread of nuclear weapons," and afford- 

 ing an opportmiity, at minimum risk, "to test the sincerity of Soviet 

 protestations about their desire to explore more sweeping arrange- 

 ments for preserving the peace." The one serious danger he perceived 

 in the situation was the "risk of euphoria." Progressin arms control 

 arrangement with the Soviet Union depended "critically" on the pres- 

 ervation of the military strength of the United States, and on the 

 condition of mind that would maintain that strength.''^ 



The question of the role of the JCS was raised again with Secretary 

 McNamara as it had been with Secretary Rusk. In response, he said*: 

 "I presented my statement to the Chiefs for word-by-word approval 

 but it is based on hours of discussion." ®° In resjDonse to a question by 

 Senator Russell, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, as to 

 whether there were plans, "if we go into the area of disarmament and 



■^« Ibid., p. 102. 



" Ibid., pp. 103-104. 



78 Ibid., p. 107. 



79 Ibid., pp. 108-109. 

 8« Ibid., p. 114. 



