213 



and expressed confidence that under the treaty the program could be 

 carried on to encompass a wide variety of interesting experiments.^^ 

 The danger of radiation from radioactive fallout, he said, was far 

 from posmg a danger, but it could easily become one with unrestricted 

 testing.^^ Senator Kussell inquired if it was correct to calculate the 

 relative blast effect of an atomic bomb as the cube root of the yield ; 

 Dr. Seaborg agreed that it was "approximately correct."' ®^ He gave 

 assurance that the AEC would maintain readiness to conduct atmos- 

 pheric tests, would carry on a strong program of underground testing, 

 and would maintain strong and healthy laboratories.^^ He assured 

 Senator Russell that it would be possible to complete an "antimissile 

 missile"' without further atmospheric testing, and that, in fact, "We 

 already have a number of warheads that are eligible for this pur- 

 jDose * * *." ^^ 



In the course of Dr. Seaborg's testimony, the chairman of the 

 committee introduced into the record a letter from Dr. I. I. Rabi of 

 Columbia University, reporting a survey he had conducted of 35 

 Americans who were Nobel Prize winners, all of whom recommended 

 approval of the treaty. 



Testhnony of the Chairman of the JCS 



Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the JCS, told the committee 

 that "the broader advantages of the test ban treaty have led the Joint 

 Chiefs of Staff to conclude that it is compatible with the security 

 interests of the United States and we support its ratification." ^ The 

 JCS, General Taylor said, had focused their analysis "on this par- 

 ticular treaty at this particular point in time." They had established 

 four criteria of acceptability relative to the national security, which 

 are paraphrased as follows : 



1. Limitations on U.S. testing would be unacceptable in 

 any militarily important area of nuclear weapon technology in which 

 the Soviet Union had or could achieve a significant advantage. 



2. A test ban treaty would be unacceptable if the Soviet Union could 

 conduct clandestine testing that would have seriously adverse effects on 

 the relative balance of military power. 



3. Withdrawal from the treaty should be uncomplicated — permitted 

 without delay in event of treaty violation or if national interests were 

 imperiled. 



4. If criteria (1) and (2) were not completely met, the treaty must 

 convey compensatory advantages elsewhere.^^ 



The JCS recognized that the Soviet Union led the United States 

 in the technology of high-yield nuclear weapons, but lagged somewhat 

 in low-yield weapons. In the ABM field, progress did not depend on 

 nuclear testing. In tactical nuclear weapons, the United States was 

 "probably ahead."" They concluded : 



s^Ibid.. pp. 210-211. 



^ Ibid., p. 214. 



^" Ibid., p. 215. The slgniflcance of this exchange ma.v not have received full recognition. 

 It signified that the destructive power of a 100-megaton bomb was only about 1.7 times 

 as great as that of a 20-megaton bomb, and only 4.6 times as great as that of a 1-megaton 

 bomb. In view of the great weight penalty of the larger yield bomb (since yield and 

 weight are about in direct proportion). Its military advantage as a weapon of destruction 

 is doubtful. 



« Ibid., p. 222. 



89 Ibid., p. 217. 



»f Ibid., p. 275. 



»i Ibid., p. 272. 



