214 



As to net superiority in ability to inflict damage on the enemy, the JCS consider 

 that the United States at present is clearly ahead of the U.S.S.R. in the ability 

 to wage strategic nuclear war, and is probably ahead in the ability to wage 

 tactical nuclear war, whereas the Soviets have developed a substantial midrange 

 ballistic m.issile capability.*^ 



As seen by the JCS the treaty presented a number of specific mili- 

 tary disadvantages, to one side or both. The United States would be 

 unable to overtake the Soviet lead in high-yield weapons. The Soviets 

 would be able to overtake the United States in low-yield tactical 

 weapons. Neither side could achieve as effective characteristics of an 

 ABM system, although both sides could probably develop one. Eate of 

 acquisition of scientific knowledge of weapons effects would be slowed. 

 Proof tests and environmental tests of weapons would be halted. 

 Clandestine tests might give the Soviets further advantages, although 

 such advantages were considered a "relatively minor factor in relation 

 to the overall present and probable balance of military strength if 

 adequate safeguards are maintained." Safeguards were particularly 

 important to minimize the advantage of the Soviets might gain from 

 a surprise abrogation. Accordingly, the JCS recommended four sets 

 of safeguards. These were : 



'te' 



(a) The conduct of comprehensive, aggressive, and continuing underground 

 nuclear test programs designed to add to our knowledge and improve our weapons 

 in all areas of significance to our military posture for the future. 



(&) The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in 

 theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and 

 insure the continued application of our human scientific resources to these pro- 

 grams on which continued progress In nuclear technology depends. 



(c) The maintenance of the facilities and resources necessary to institute 

 promptly nuclear tests in the atmosphere should they be deemed essential to our 

 national security or should the treaty or any of its terms be abrogated by the 

 Soviet Union. 



(d) The improvement of capability, within feasible and practical limits, to 

 monitor the terms of the treaty, to detect violations, and to maintain our knowl- 

 edge of Sino-Soviet nuclear activity, capabilities, and achievements." 



General Taylor concluded his formal presentation by expressing 

 an apprehension that a state of "euphoria" might "reduce our vigilance 

 and the willingness of our country and of our allies to expand 

 [expend?] continued effort on our collective security."®* He assured 

 the committee that the JCS had been consulted during the development 

 of the treaty, and during the Moscow negotiations he himself had 

 served as intermediary to keep them informed and to express their 

 views to the White House. He acknowledged that the Soviet Union 

 was not to be trusted. He assured the committee that the United States 

 would not observe the treaty if it were not in the national interest 

 (but would observe the 00-day waiting period before withdrawing 

 from it) , that the JCS saw nothing in the treaty to prohibit the use 

 of nuclear weapons in warfare, and that the limitation upon the 

 proof-testing of systems was probably the hardest condition for them 

 to accept. 



Mr. McCone, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, then went 

 before the committee in executive session, to discuss classified matters 

 concerning what Secretary Rusk had earlier described as the "high 

 degree of confidence" in U.S. abilitv to detect "anv violations" of the 



"2 Ibid., p. 27.^. 



"3 Ibid., pp. 274-275. 



«* Ibid., p. 276. 



