216 



On the contrary, by driving a wedge between us and our allies, I see how this 

 treaty might facilitate the further expansion of communism.^"' 



Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe, of the University of Pennsylvania, an- 

 alyzed the treaty in terms of the relationship between a free society 

 and a Communist or closed society. He expressed fear that the treaty 

 might weaken the NATO alliance. The 90-day withdrawal provision 

 of the treaty, he believed, unduly favored an unscrupulous state that 

 did not honor it, and might give rise to endless uncertainties — or even 

 worse, to lags m the response by an open society to suspicion of treaty 

 violation by a closed society. Another weakness of the treaty in his 

 view was that it set a precedent for uninspected arms agreements. 

 And finally, the goal of tension reduction was of dubious merit in 

 dealing "with an opponent who seeks world domination * * *." ^°* Ac- 

 cordingly, he recommended that the Senate accede to the treaty, but 

 only subject to stipulations involving assertion of the right to use nu- 

 clear weapons in war, to transfer them to allies at any time, to instant 

 abrogation if necessary; also, stipulations asserting the inspection 

 principle, assurance of nonrecognition of the East German regime, 

 and the need for periodic reports of various kinds.^*'^ In the absence 

 of any of these, he advocated rejection of the treaty. 



Technical support for the treaty 



A principal technical witness for the Administration was Dr. Harold 

 Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering and earlier 

 director of Lawrence Radiation Laboratoiy, Livermore, Calif. Dr. 

 Brown systematically analyzed the effects of the test ban treaty upon 

 various categories of weaponry- and concluded that, if fully observed, 

 it would "actually improve somewhat the position of the United States 

 vis-a-vis the Soviet Union * * *." Moreover, he said, "I do not believe 

 that the Soviets can impair to an important degree our strategic 

 superiority." 



Having satisfied myself as completely as is humanly possible that the 

 proposed treaty cannot substantially impair our strategic superiority if we 

 take the steps which we can to continue our nuclear developments and remain 

 prepared, and that indeed it could enhance our strategic superiority com- 

 pared with unlimited testing. I find the arguments for it on broader grounds 

 persuasive, and I fully support its ratification.^"* 



It was true. Dr. Brown conceded, that the Soviets had bested the 

 Ignited States in the "upper end of the yield spectrum" because of a 

 "considered decision by the United States not to concentrate effort 

 in this field." The attention to smaller yield devices had facilitated 

 the development of ICBM and IRBM weaponry by the United States. 

 IVIoreover, "with our present Iniowledge and further underground 

 testing we can continue development of relatively small warheads 

 which would be used to assure penetration by saturation even of 

 sophisticated and very elaborate ballistic missile defenses." In weap- 

 ons effects tests, the United States appeared to be generally ahead 

 of the Soviet Union (a i^oint tliat Dr. Teller disputed). Effect of 

 Aveapons against hardened missile sites was determined more by ac- 

 curacy of delivery system than by jaeld of warhead. Similarly, coiu- 



■■fs ihifl.. p. 454. 

 '^"^Ihifl.. p. .51.5. 

 '"= Ibifl.. p. 517. 

 it« Ibid., pp. 541-542. 



