217 



mand and control systems of the United States were being hardened, 

 so that vuhierability of these was not a factor.^°' 



In knowledge of the effect of high altitude nuclear bursts on com- 

 munications blackout, radar blackout, and nuclear weapons vulner- 

 ability, Dr. Brown said, the United States and the Soviet Union 

 were comparable. Both countries would be able to "design around our 

 uncertainties." Also in ABM development, efforts of the United States 

 "are comparable in magnitude and in success with those of the So- 

 viets." Dr. Brown did not consider Soviet development of a 100- 

 megaton bomb of crucial significance : 



The actual military worth of 100-megaton weapons to the United States is 

 not clear either to the military or technical authorities in the Defense De- 

 partment. Their ix)ssible effects could not have been thoroughly explored by 

 the Soviets in their development tests. We are sure that two or three smaller 

 bombs are equally or more effective against important military targets than 

 one of the large Soviet bombs.^"*^ 



The various possible modes of "cheating" under the treaty, he 

 judged, were not worth the effort, or would nm serious risk of de- 

 tection, or both: "attempted violation carries high risks of detec- 

 tion wherever there is significant motivation for violation." ^°^ Both 

 the United States and the Soviet Union needed more information to 

 develop satisfactory defense postures in weapons effects on hardened 

 sites and ABM development. However, "preventing a war is far more 

 important than any knowledge that you might get." ^^° 



On the other hand, if they cheat as much as they can, and if they prepare a 

 surprise under the treaty and abrogate it. if there is a surprise abrogation, I think 

 that they may gain some small and temporary military advantage. I think that 

 is the worst that can happen, and in my view that is not a serious argument 

 against the treaty.^ 



Following Dr. Brown's appearance, the committee took testimony 

 from Dr. Norris E. Bradbury, Director of the Los Alamos Scientific 

 Laboratory, and from Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Lawrence 

 Radiation Laboratory, both AEC installations. Bradbury favored 

 ratification of the treaty. He declared that in the nuclear arsenal of 

 the United States "every weapon delivery system which can effectively 

 use a nuclear warhead has one * * *." It was true that in yield-to- weight 

 ratio of the "very largest multimegaton weapons" the Soviet UnYon 

 "appears to have concentrated more effort than has the United States." 

 It had been a matter of policy on the part of the United States not 

 to build such large-yield warheads but it could be done. He stressed the 

 importance of the development of delivery systems over warheads and 

 confirmed assertions by earlier witnesses that testing was not a con- 

 sideration in the development of missiles or an ABM system. He saw 

 no great risk in the halting of research in underwater nuclear ex- 

 plosions. ("We certainly have much more experience in underwater 

 testing area than any other country.") ^^~ The same situation existed 

 with the study of blackout phenomena, the radio interference effects 

 in a nuclear explosion environment. Underground testing continued 

 to be necessary to the security of the United States, and the JCS safe- 



^"^ Ibid., p. 529. 



i<^^ Ibid., pp. 531-532. 



It's Ibid., pp. 531-532. 



"» Ibid., p. .544. 



1" Ibid., pp. 574-575. 



"2 Ibid., p. 581. 



