218 



guards were also necessary to deter the Soviet Union from abro- 

 gating."^ Dr. Bradbury also said it was possible to test "without undue 

 difficulty" weapons with yields up to one megaton underground."* 

 "I suspect we are probably ahead of Russia in warheads." Under- 

 ground testing would enable virtually every area of weapon develop- 

 ment to continue. "The only area where we have to rest upon our 

 current knowledge is in this area of blackout phenomenology." "-^ 



Dr. Foster was less assured than Dr. Bradbury as to the accept- 

 ability of the treaty. Without atmospheric tests, he said, "I doubt that 

 we can develop and maintain the requisite skill in the important area 

 of the effects of nuclear weapons." Of greatest importance was the 

 fact that the treaty prevented proof tests of warheads and weapon 

 systems. I 



Missile systems for offeuse or defense [said Foster] are extremely complex, 

 yet must function not only under the ideal laboratory conditions in which they 

 are usually tested, but also under the most adverse conditions — those of nuclear 

 war."' 



In this connection Dr. Foster attached particular importance to 

 problems of blackout and penetration — and to actual tests of pro- 

 posed solutions. He expressed apprehension "that in an expanding 

 technology vigorously pursued, there frequently result abrupt increases 

 in scientific knowledge — rapidly reflected in military capability — 

 which could upset the balance of power." 



The proposed treaty would limit not only our knowledge of the actual state 

 of Soviet military development, but would also restrict our knowledge of what 

 may even be technically possible * * *. Thus, from purely technical-military con- 

 siderations, the proposed treaty appears to me disadvantageous."' 



Surprise abrogation by the Soviet Union, he thought, constituted a 

 greater hazard for the United States than did clandestine tests.^^® 

 Moreover, because of the closed and secret nature of the Soviet society, 

 the treaty would favor the Soviets if rough parity in weapons capability 

 prevailed in the two countries.^^^ 



The testimony of Willard F. Libby, a former chairman of the 

 Atomic Energy Commission, was cautiously in support of the treaty. 

 Said Libby : "In summary, I think on the whole I probably would 

 favor the treaty, but I would have to see the latest on the 100-megaton 

 problem and have Plowshare reassurance before doing so." The 

 problem of maintaining the laboratories was "largely a matter of 

 funding." ^^o 



&• 



Legal and 'political considerations^ pro and con 



Adm. Lewis L. Strauss (U.S. Navy, retired), another former chair- 

 man of the Atomic Energy Commission, was more critical. Judging 

 that "early ratification of the treaty now appears probable," he urged 

 upon the committee "two Senate reservations and four actions" to 

 reduce the risk of the treaty to the United States. The reference in the 

 treaty to "or any other nuclear explosion" should be clarified to per- 

 mit employment of nuclear weapons at any time to defend the United 



^ Ibid., p. 582. 



"* Ibid., p. 5S7. 



"sibid., p. 601. 



"8 Ibid., pp. 614-615. 



^'' Ibid., p. 616. 



"8 Ibid., p. 617. 



119 Ibid., p. 619. 



"» Ibid., p. 641. 



