220 



tliat the ABM problem was probably insolvable, so that attention 

 should instead be concentrated on deterrence by attack capability ; and 

 that it would not be possible to forecast with scientific precision the 

 nature of a future attack upon the United States. Concurring with Dr. 

 Brown, he noted that "ever since shortly after World War II, the 

 military power of the United States has been steadily increasing; 

 over the same period the national security of the United States has 

 been rapidly and inexorably diminishing." ^-'^ Dr. York believed that 

 for this paradoxical dilemma there was "absolutely no solution to 

 be found within the areas of science and technology." ^^^ Both the 

 United States and the Soviet Union were unilaterally capable of in- 

 flicting damage on the other, and on each side the capability was grow- 

 ing, although the United States has "always been way ahead of them 

 in this matter." ^-^ The effect of the test ban treaty would be merely 

 to retard slightly the rate at which the national security is diminishing. 

 On the question of the possible effectiveness of an alleged deployed 

 ABM system in the Soviet Union, Dr. Brown, in response to a ques- 

 tion by Senator Lausche, had earlier replied: "All I would want to 

 say in open session is that there is evidence of possible anti-ballistic- 

 missile activity. I do not believe that there is a completed anti-ICBM 

 installation." Dr. York saw no merit in the ABM concept : 



Senator Lausche. Would you mind expressing an opinion as to wliy Red 

 Russia deployed an ABM system if it is not the effective one that they think 

 they have? 



Dr. York. Yes. Some of their scientists or engineers sold them a bill of goods. 

 That happens here, too.^ 



Analysis of political im'pacts of the treaty 



The testimony of Dr. Shulman, of the Fletcher School of Law and 

 Diplomacy, dealt with the question as to why the Soviet Union was 

 interested in a test ban treaty at the given time, and the import of 

 this time-related situation for the United States. Internally, he said, 

 the Soviet system was then preoccupied with "shortcomings in the 

 economy," a reshuffling of second-tier leadership, and ideological ad- 

 justments among Soviet intellectuals vis-a-vis the regime. 



Externally, the Soviet Union was confronted with two sets of prob- 

 lems — one in relation to other States in the Communist bloc, and the 

 other in relation to non-Communist States. The former set related 

 mainly to the ideological dispute between an intransigent "Stalinist" 

 faction led by Communist China which took exception to the more 

 flexible concept held by Soviet Eussia of "peaceful coexistence." Other 

 divisive problems attributable to the "increasingly complex imperial 

 structure" of the Soviet Union and its system of Eastern European 

 satellites were also generating economic strains and political tensions 

 in Eastern Europe. 



The second set of problems, involving those States external to the 

 Communist bloc, was characterized by diminution of prospects of 

 success for achievement of Communist expansionist goals.^^° Soviet 

 leadership appeared to have concluded that the test ban would con- 

 tribute to the favorable resolution of these problems. As perceived by 



^8 Ibid., p. 761. 

 "^ Ibid.. M. 762. 

 J^ Ibid., p. 76S. 

 129 Ibid., p. 571. 

 "«Ibid., p. 793. 



