221 



tlie Soviet leadership, the effects of the test ban could be expressed as 

 (in paraphrase) : 



1. A reduction in international tensions without rendering the Soviet 

 Union "vulnerable to a Chinese charge of 'capitulation to the 

 imperialists'." 



^. Exploitation of the Soviet "peace*" issue, causing the Chinese to 

 appear to be the "war" faction within the Communist bloc. 



3. The resultants of the reduced tensions between East and West 

 would cause reduced pressure by the West, promote divisions within 

 NATO, reduce stimulus for appropriations and mobilization of mili- 

 tarj^ resources bj'^ the West, inhibit Western reliance on the nuclear 

 deterrent, and tend to expand long-term opportunity for economic 

 and political detente with the West. 



The consequences of these actions for the United States, as Shulman 

 analyzed them, would be (in paraphrase) : 



1. Soviet acceptance of the "noninevitability of war." From the 

 American point of view this would be a desirable shift. 



2. Although military superiority of the United States over the Soviet 

 Union remained essential, "measures which we may take in the uni- 

 lateral pursuit of security which call into question our intentions may 

 have the effect of diminishing our security, if they serve to intensify 

 adversary action or preparations, particularly in research and de- 

 velopment which may lead to destabilizing technological advances." 

 The treaty dramatizes the fact that the Soviet- American intei'action is 

 a "limited adversary relationship," extremely serious but neither total 

 nor absolute. Our securit}- is interlocked and makes j)0ssible some kinds 

 of mutually advantageous safeguards. 



3. The Soviets have come to a sober realization of the advantages 

 of arms control or "partial measures." 



4. "* * * There is a substantial amount of interaction between 

 Soviet policy and our own, and * * * the condition which has most 

 favored the evolution of Soviet policy in the direction of modera- 

 tion has been a firm resistance to Soviet probes, combined witli demon- 

 strated political and economic vitality on the part of the non- 

 Communist nations." ^^^ 



Shulman warned that the Soviet-American relationship contained 

 dangers if the Western alliance were pennitted to deteriorate or appear 

 as less than a solid front, and also if a sense of "euphoria" resulted in 

 reduced vigilance on the part of the military forces and the support 

 of them.^^- 



Arthur Dean, who had served as chairman of the delegation to the 

 Nuclear Test Ban Conference at Geneva in 1961, as chairman of the 

 U.S. delegation to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference at 

 Geneva until December 31, 1962, and as a member of the T^.S. delega- 

 tion to the United Nations and the 16th and 17th General Assemblies, 

 told the committee that he favored approval of the treaty but urged 

 continued efforts to achieve agreement on a comprehensive test ban.^^^ 



The concluding technical witness. Dr. Kistiakowsky of Harvard, 

 endorsed particularly the testimony of Harold Brown, and stressed 

 the inherent lag of ABM technology relative to offensive missile tech- 



i« Ibid., pp. 795-799. 

 i»2 Ibid., p. SOO. 

 ^ Ibid., p. 845. 



