222 



nology. He saw greater risk in continued unrestricted testing than 

 from the treaty. As to the issue of whether testing in outer space 

 (prohibited under the treaty) could be conducted clandestinely with 

 advantage, he suggested that solar flares would confuse the results 

 from such tests.^^* 



In the questioning that followed his prepared statement, Dr. 

 Kistiakowsky took specific exception to Dr. Teller's assertion that 

 the Soviets led in ABM development and stressed instead the im- 

 portance of maintaining a retaliatory capability.^^^ Without the treaty, 

 he said, both the United States and the So'Ndet Union might pursue the 

 development and testing of very high-yield weapons, other nations 

 would embark upon nuclear weapons programs involving atmos- 

 pheric tests, radioactivity in the atmosphere would increase, and the 

 only outcome would be war."^ He discounted the importance of the 

 limitation imposed by the treaty upon the Plowshare program.^" 



The point at which Dr. Kistiakowsky appeared, in the light of his 

 senior position as a scientist and presidential adviser, and the extent 

 to which his testimonj^ rebutted that of Dr. Teller (often explicitly), 

 suggests that he had been called upon to counteract the very con- 

 siderable effect of Dr. Teller's testimony.^^^ 



Hearings hefore Preparedness Investigating Siihco7nmittee 



The separate test ban hearings conducted before the Preparedness 

 Investigating Subcommittee, under the chairmanship of Senator John 

 Stennis, were begun May 7, 1963, and continued through August 27. 

 They filled two volumes, of which the first dealt mainly with policy 

 regarding the earlier comprehensive test ban proposal.^^^ 



The hearings held by the Preparedness Subcommittee after the treaty 

 had been submitted to the Senate for approval, August 8, duplicated 

 much of the matter presented before the Foreign Relations Committee. 

 Because the subcommittee limited its scope to the military aspects of 

 test ban matters — and the treaty — choice of witnesses before it tended 

 to emphasize active and retired military officers. (See table.) The tenor 

 of the questioning was also distinguished by a more military flavor. 



1=^ Ibid., p. 857. 



135 Ibid., pp. 859-860. 



i3« Ibid., p. 863. 



"7 Ibid., p. 870. 



138 Examples of the concern shown by treaty supporters for the statement-s by Teller 

 are abundant throughout the hearings. It is likely that a concerted effort was made to 

 establisli as weighty an accumulation of informed professional opinion a.s possible to 

 counteract the statements by Teller, for future use in the debate on the Senate floor 

 For example : 



Senator Hdmphrey (to Dr. Brown) : "Finally, did Teller have access to information 

 that is not available to you ?" p. 578. 



Chairman Fulbkight (to Dr. Bradbury) : "Have you read, had a chance to read, 

 Dr. Teller's testimony?" Ibid., p. 584. 



Chairman Fulbkight (to Dr. York) : "I don't like to deal with personalities but he 

 (Teller) was the most effective witness and he testified all day with a very large attend- 

 ance and obviously made a large impression upon the committee and through the televi- 

 sion on the country." Ibid., pp. 763-764. 



Chairman Fdlbright (to Dr. Kistiakowsky) : "On the basis of your past professional 

 contact with Dr. Teller, who is undoubtedly the leading opponent of this treaty in the 

 scientific field, could you tell us the reasons, in your opinion, for Dr. Teller's dogmatic 

 and very positive .judgment with regard to agreements to control nuclear weapons tests?" 

 Ibid., p. 860. 



"B The Senate hearings were in two volumes, pts. 1 and 2: U.S. Congress. Senate. 

 Committee on Armed Services. Military Aspects and Implications of Nuclear Test Ban 

 Proposals and Related Matters. Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Sub- 

 committee. 8Sth (L'ong., 1st sess. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964). 

 Pp. 1-390 dealt with test ban matters generally and with the comprehensive test ban. 

 Beginning on p. 391, and continuing through p. 540 of the first volume and all of pt. 2 

 (pp. 541-981. exclusive of the index), the testimony received by the subcommittee re- 

 lated specifically to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. 



