223 



Table I. Table of witnesses 



Witnesses appearing before both Foreign Affairs Committee and Pre- 



pareaness investigating iSubcom7nittee 

 Dr. Norris E. Bradbury, Director, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. 

 Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering. 

 Dr. John Foster, Director, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory. 

 Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, U.S. Air Force, Chief of Staff. 

 Adm. David J. McDonald, U.S. Xavy, Chief of Xaval Operations. 

 Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

 Dr. Edward Teller, University of California. 

 Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, U.S. Army, Chief of Staff. 



Witnesses heard only by Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee 



Adm. George W. Anderson, U.S. Navy (retired), formerly Chief of 

 Naval Operations. 



Adm. Arleigh Burke, U.S. Navy (retired), formerly Chief of Naval 

 Operations. 



Gen. Thomas S. Power, U.S. Air Force, Commander, Strategic Air 

 Command. 



Gen. Bernard A. Shriever, U.S. Air Force, Commander, Air Force 

 Systems Command. 



Gen. Nathan F. Twining, U.S. Air Force (retired), formerly Chair- 

 man, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 



Military opposition : The theory of maximum deterrence 



Gen. Thomas S. Power, U.S. Air Force, Commander of the Stra- 

 tegic Air Command (SAC), declared at the outset of his testimony 

 that : "I am not in favor of the test ban treaty." He enumerated many 

 details of operational missiles with nuclear warheads in the arsenal 

 of his command that had not been proved out. "We have never com- 

 pletely tested any of the nuclear weapons in SAC's arsenal," he 

 declared. "We are dealing with the security of the United States, 

 and if facts can be obtained I want to have them." ^^° General Power 

 proceeded to outline a comprehensive philosophy probably shared by 

 many opponents of the treaty. He said, in part : 



We could not be in the position of talking with confidence that we could 

 prevent a thermonuclear war unless we were strong, and we basically got our 

 strength through these weapons and through testing. I just feel that the surest 

 way to prevent war — and that is my goal, and I feel very strongly about it — 

 is to have overwhelming strength so that it is ridiculous for anybody to even 

 think of attacking the United States. That is what it has been in the past, and 

 that is what it is today. 



It has unpleasant features, yes, but the surest way in my opinion of pre- 

 venting a thermonuclear war is to have overwhelming strength, and I think 

 this is the one area in which we can beat anyone. 



I think our science, our economy, and everything else can help us win this 

 race. We have won it in the past, and I think we can continue to win it. But 

 it takes the will to do it. That is an ofE-the-cufC summation about how I feel 

 about it.^*^ 



General Power said it was important to test the survivability of 

 hardened missile sites under actual missile attack.^*- He discounted 

 the "overkill" theory and remarked that "not every bomb is going 

 to arrive at the target." The purpose was to "make this thing so sure 



^^^ Ibid., pp. 779-780. 

 ^" Ibid., p. 782. 

 ^« Ibid., p. 785. 



