224 



that it will deter anyone'' and thus prevent war,"^ Disarmament, he 

 said, was "a proven concept to get you into a war." 



In other words, you have an aggressor, and he never attacks unless he has 

 a victim, somebody whom he can attack and get a profit out of it. He looks for 

 a weak nation, a nation that disarms itself.^" 



Adm. George A. Anderson, Jr., made two appearances before the 

 Preparedness Subcommittee. His first appearance was June 26, when 

 as Chief of Naval Operations, he spoke on behalf of the JCS to oppose 

 the comprehensive test ban proposal of the United States. His second 

 appearance, on Friday, August 23, was shortly after his retirement 

 from active duty at which time his statement was "strictly personal." 

 First, he noted that both the United States and the Soviet Union 

 enjoyed certain advantages which the treaty would tend to perpetuate. 

 There was "far less risk" under the limited ban than there had been 

 under the proposed comprehensive ban because "we are not placing 

 unwarranted reliance on trust to avoid violations or depending upon 

 inadequate inspection measures in this regard." ^*^ He recommended 

 that the Senate clarify the conditions under which "general and com- 

 plete disarmament," as mentioned in the treaty preamble, would be 

 feasible; he also called for clarification of such treaty terms as "any 

 other nuclear explosion," "territorial waters," and the definition of 

 underground test."^ With respect to safeguards, he endorsed the views 

 of the JCS, and urged — 



* * * that the possible consequences of this treaty are so vital to our national 

 security, yet so uncertain in the light of known Soviet objectives that, in addition 

 to the foregoing, it should be the sense of the Senate in connection with ratifica- 

 tion to require the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make frequent and periodic reports 

 to the Secretary of Defense, to the President, and to the appropriate committees 

 of the Congress of their continuing assessment of the military balance of power 

 and the military risks to our national security.^" 



Subject to these "stipulations," Anderson said : "I believe the Sen- 

 ate of the United States should ratify this treaty." "^ 



On the day before he appeared before the Foreign Relations Com- 

 mittee, General LeMay was a witness before the Preparedness Sub- 

 committee. In the latter enviromnent he went into considerably 

 greater detail concerning the specific disadvantages of the treaty as 

 he saw them, although he believed that "if we carry out the safeguards 

 in an efficient manner" then "the risk of losing any more ground is 

 small." On the other hand, he said, "we may get some very great 

 rewards out of the political field if indeed the predictions come 

 true." "^ The main rewards he identified as the division of the Chi- 

 nese and the Russians,^^° slowing of nuclear proliferation,^^^ respond- 

 ing affirmatively to the hopes of other nations, and, conversely, the 

 propaganda benefits to the Soviet Union of rejection of the treaty by 

 the United States.^^^ In this context General LeMay was asked what 



"2 Ibid., p. 792. 



1" Ibid., p. 810. 



^« Ibid., pp. S92-893. 



"« Ibid., pp. 892-893. 



^" Ibid., pp. 893-894. 



1" Ibid., p. 894. The terminology used by the admiral wag not precise, In that the rati- 

 fication process is performed by the President ; the function of the Senate Is to contribute 

 its "consent" under the Constitution to enable the President to ta.ke this action. However, 

 the error was a common one. 



!« Ibid., p. 722. 



^0 Ibid., p. 738. 



1^ Ibid., p. 754. 



^2 Ibid., p. 751. 



