225 



his position would be if the treaty were not yet signed but merely in 

 the proposal stage. The following exchange took place : 



General LeMay. I hadn't thought of it in that light before. I think that if we 

 were in a proiwsal stage that I would recommend against it. I think one of the 

 factors that weighs heavily with me was the situation we find ourselves in in 

 having signed it. I think that is important. 



Senator Thurmond. You would recommend against it if it were in the pro- 

 posal stage? 



General LeMay. I believe I would ; yes, sir. 



I haven't given it much thought in this atmosphere but just a quick answer I 

 would say that is what I probably would do.^°^ 



General Schriever, Commander of the Air Force Systems Command, 

 told Senator Stennis that he would not feel seriously handicapped in 

 carrying out his mission of weapons development under the treaty.^^^ 

 There would be restraints on the development of high-yield weapons, 

 a matter which he considered of marginal importance,^^^ proof tests 

 would not be permitted which meant that some extent of overdesign 

 would be necessary ,^^^ and in the effects area, "we are extremely lim- 

 ited"' with particular respect to blackout phenomena and reentry.^^'' 

 He attached great importance to the vigorous im.plementation of the 

 four JCS "Safeguards," and identified the Secretary of Defense and 

 the AEC chairman as the Government officials principally responsible 

 for carrying them out.^^* The deployment of an ABM system was less 

 crucial, although he thought one should be developed.^^^ There was 

 risk associated with the treaty, but the United States, he believed, had 

 a "considerable strategic superiority" over the Soviet Union and 

 could improve the sundvability of its deterrent force without atmos- 

 pheric testing.^^° 



The last two witnesses to come before the Preparedness Subcom- 

 mittee were two retired military officers. Admiral Burke and General 

 Twining. Burke said he was opposed to the treaty because it provided 

 for no inspection within the Soviet Union. "Without a system of 

 inspections which makes it possible to enforce realistically the sin- 

 cerity of stated intentions, a test ban treaty cannot lead to the results 

 which are claimed for it." ^^^ 



He was sure that no pressure had been brought to bear on the JCS 

 to support the treaty. If the treaty was to be approved by the Senate, 

 he recommended that the Senate assure itself that the JCS safeguards 

 were "carefully, clearly, and distinctly spelled out [and also] that the 

 safeguards are carefully implemented and continued to be imple- 

 mented throughout the life of this treaty." ^^- 



General Twining, the concluding witness, believed that "political 

 considerations aside, the treaty will eventually weaken our military 

 capacity." He noted that the Soviets had surpassed the United States 

 in high-yield weapons, had tested weapons that were "exceedingly 



'■^ Ibid., p. 757. However, before the Foreign Relations Committee hearing, the following 

 day, in answer to the same question, he replied : "I had not given any thought to that 

 particular one. This is an important question. I would think that I would have beea 

 against it. 



"But I am not sure until I spend some time on the problem." Op, eit., p. 372. 



1" Preparedness Subcommittee hearing, op. cit., p. 821. 



'^ Ibid., pp. 837, 841. 



^ Ibid., p. 821. 



"7 Idem. 



i« Ibid., pp. 823-825. 



'68 Ibid., p. 829. 



'w Ibid., pp. 830-831. 



i« Ibid., p. 938. 



"» Ibid., p. 939. 



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