226 



clean," and could overcome by testing underground the U.S. 

 lead in low-yield weapons. There were military disadvantages for the 

 United States in the treaty if it were faithfully observed. Moreover, 

 the attitude of the Soviet Union toward treaties was one of expedience. 

 He was apprehensive about the reasons behind Soviet willingness to 

 accept the treaty. He feared apathy in the United States. He regretted 

 that the treaty contained no provision for inspection and veritication. 

 Peace depended on U.S. superiority in wea]Dons. Therefore— 



It is my fervent hope that if this treaty is ratified, the legislative branch of the 

 Goverumeut of the United States will take appropriate and concurrent action 

 to guarantee that the safeguards recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are 

 aggressively pursued.^** 



In clarification of his position. General Twining noted that it was 

 based on military considerations alone. He reserA^ed judgment on the 

 total question as there were "political considerations that the military 

 men never hear about because they are not told to the military." ^^* 



TV. Reports of the CoMMiTrEES 



To some degree the findings in the repoii:s of the two Committees, 

 and the subsequent votes of their members on approval of the treaty, 

 reflected the scope of the issues as differently defined in the two sets of 

 hearings. As the Foreign Relations Committee wrote in the conclusion 

 to its report : 



A good part of the committee's time and attention during the hearings was 

 devoted to military considerations. This treaty does bear, though perhaps not 

 heavily, on the military balance. But its thrust is political. And among other 

 things, it illustrates that military considerations cannot be divorced from po- 

 litical considerations ; they are inseparable, especially in the nuclear age. The 

 maintenance of a strong military position is clearly essential to the national 

 security of the United States. But exclusive, or excessive, reliance on military 

 considerations could undermine national security by encouraging comparable 

 military efforts by others, thereby strengthening the destabilizing forces adrift 

 in the world, possibly creating new ones. 



This treaty offers the prospect of a gradual lessening of tensions, of a start 

 toward the progressive elimination of the danger of nuclear war. Thus, the com- 

 mittee (by a vote of 16 to 1) recommends that the Senate give its advice and 

 consent to the ratification of the pending treaty.^'" 



Although the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee recognized 

 in its Interim Report that there were "other factors which, while not 

 within the scope of this report, are pertinent to a final judgment on 

 the treaty," it stressed "very strongly" that "Soviet secrecy and du- 

 plicity requires that this Nation possess a substantial margin of supe- 

 riority in both the quality and the quantity of its implements of 

 defense." "^ 



In considering the impact and effect of the proposed test ban [declared the 

 report] it is important to remember that for nearly two decades this Nation has 

 been confronted by an adversary who has openly and repeatedly proclaimed that 

 his dominant goal is to destroy the nations of the non-Communist world. Only 

 because we have maintained clear military superiority and the ability to inflict 



W3 Ibid., pp. 972-973. 



18* Ibid., r>. 975. 



1*^11.8. Congress. Senate. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, The Nuclear 

 Test Ban Treaty, on Exec. M, Exec. Rept. No. 3, Sept. 3, 1963, 88th Cong., 1st sess. 

 (Washington, 1963), p. 26. Ordered to be printed. 



1"^ U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee ou Armed Services. Investigation of the pre- 

 paredness program, Interim Report by Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, under 

 the Authority of S. Res. 75 "on the Military Implications of the Proposed Limited Nuclear 

 Test Ban Treaty," printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services (committee 

 print) 88th Cong., ist sess. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 12. 



