227 



unacceptable damage upon him has the would-be aggressor been deterred. The 

 basis of our deterrence is military superiority which, in turn, is based on our 

 nuclear weapons programs and nuclear retaliatory forces. 



It is vital to our survival that no step be taken which in any manner would 

 impair the integrity and credibility of our deterrence or degrade the ability of 

 our military forces to protect our security if we should be challenged militarily 

 by a hostile nuclear power.^" 



Both committees accepted the need for the preservation by the 

 United States of a nuclear deterrent — and for an unmistakably su- 

 perior nuclear force. The issue lay in the relative degree of impor- 

 tance — and the consequences foreseen — in combining this force with 

 efforts in the political sphere to break the ideological deadlock between 

 East and West. The first quotation suggests that the Foreign Eela- 

 tions Committee was feeling its way toward this concept. Yet the com- 

 mittee devoted most of its effort to searching carefully for pitfalls. 

 Tliese turned out to be mainly in the area of military technology : "In 

 assessing the balance of technical and military risks of the treaty, the 

 committee sought to compare the technological as well as the military 

 capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union." ^^^ 



Possibly because the Preparedness Subcommittee limited itself to 

 consideration of only the military aspects of the test ban treaty, a 

 majority of its members by their eventual vote on the treaty, Septem- 

 ber 24, showed that they regarded the military aspects as of command- 

 ing importance and decisively adverse. The possibility that there 

 were genuine military advantages in the treaty does not appear to have 

 been seriously entertained. This interpretation may be reinforced by 

 tiie words of Senator Saltonstall, a member of the subcommittee whose 

 dissenting view was i^resented at the conclusion of the interim report. 

 Senator Saltonstall said that he favored ratification of the treaty, and 

 that, while the factual data contained in the report were accurately 

 stated, "its general findings and conclusions are unduly pessimistic as 

 to the effect of this treaty, if ratified, upon our national security." "^ 



The two reports each demonstrated a substantial consensus within 

 the respective committees. The Foreign Relations Committee report 

 was approved by a vote of 16 to 1 (the lone dissident later identified 

 himself as Senator Long of Louisiana) ,^^° although Senator Lausche, 

 who voted to approve the report, later voted against the treaty in the 

 final action on September 24. The Preparedness Subcommittee's in- 

 terim report was signed by six of its seven members, although Senator 

 Symington, while praising the hearing as "the most complete record 

 ever made on this vital subject," agreed with Senator Saltonstall that 

 the conclusions drawn in the report were "overly pessimistic." He 

 said : "Based on the record, I am worried about the treaty ; but more 

 worried about the possibility of an all-out nuclear exchange some day 

 in the future — particularly if there is a proliferation of nuclear weap- 

 ons among more countries." He saw^ the treaty as a first step in impos- 

 ing control on nuclear weapons and declared his intention of voting 

 for it.i'i The dissident member of the Preparedness Subcommittee, 



18" Ibid., p. 1. 



I'* Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 10. In point of fact, the 

 committee's report, 26 pages in length, devoted 314 pages to historical background, 

 3% pages to the substance of the treaty, IVa pages to a tabulation of witnesses, 13 pages 

 to military technology, 2V2 pages to Plowshare, fallout, and procedural matters, and 

 2 pages to political considerations. 



1^ "Interim Report by Preparedness Subcommittee," op. clt., p. 14. 



^•"Congressional Record (Sept. 20, 1963), p. 16730. 



1" "Interim Report by Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee," op cit., p. 13. 



