228 



Senator Saltonstall, expressed the belief that insufficient attention had 

 been given to testimony of responsible Government officials before the 

 Foreign Relations Committee that had tended to counteract, for him,, 

 the "overly adverse" conclusions of the interim report.^^^ 



Findings of the Foreign Relations Gonvmittee 



The report of the Foreign Relations Committee dealt systemati- 

 cally with the various issues that had been raised in the course of the 

 hearings, either by witnesses or by Members of the Senate themselves. 

 It stressed the bipartisan nature of the treaty and that it was "an 

 American proposal.*' Also, that the United Kingdom, closest ally of 

 the United States, supported it.^"^ 



Why had the Soviet Union, after a long history of opposition to this 

 form of test ban, changed its position ? While admitting the specula- 

 tive nature of its answer, the committee adduced five reasons for the 

 Soviet reversal. First, progress in Soviet nuclear teclmology had pro- 

 \dded assurance that the Soviets could accept the teclmological conse- 

 quences of the test ban. Second, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 had 

 been "a sobering experience." Third, the test ban might have been 

 regarded by Soviet leaders as a means to strengthen Soviet leadership 

 of the Communist States in view of the "Sino-Soviet scliism." Fourth, 

 the "social and political ferment in the Soviet Union" was seen as a 

 motivation to impel the Soviet leadership to enlarge production of 

 peaceful products for consumers at the expense of the military sector 

 of the economy. Fifth, "Soviet leadership seems to share Washington's 

 concern with the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons." ^'* 



In describing tlie treaty itself, the committee accepted the views and 

 interpretations of the Secretaries of State and Defense. The treaty 

 "in no way" prohibited the use of nuclear weapons in time of war.^'^ 

 Any amendment to the treaty "must be submitted to the Senate and 

 approved before it can take effect." ^^^ The treaty would not effect the 

 recognition of "regimes" wliich the United States had chosen not to 

 recognize.^" The 90-day waiting period before withdrawal from the 

 treaty (as provided in article IV) was clarified as to meaning, but also 

 as to its effect on resumption of testing : "As a practical matter * * * 

 the committee was told that with a high state of readiness, even the 

 simplest nuclear test series requires 2 months' preparation, develop- 

 ment tests 3 months, and effects tests 6 months." ^^^ The committee had 

 also been told that the withdrawal arrangement had been inserted in 

 the treaty to satisfy the JCS. 



In anticipation of the question as to the function of the Senate in 

 advising on the treaty before the fact, the report assured that body 

 that "The committee was periodically consulted by the executive 

 branch during the course of the negotiation of the treaty." ^'® 



Committee citations of pnncipal points in testimony 



The report reviewed the positions of witnesses, noting that the 

 treaty was favored by all but one (Dr. Foster) of the Government wit- 



-" Ibid., p. 14. 



1" Ibid., p. 2. 



"* Ibid., pp. 2-3. 



i"' Ibid., p. 5. 



"8 Ibid., p. 6. This statement In the report, which the President categorically confirmed, 

 was questioned by Senator Russell, who prevailed upon the Senate to insert a proviso in 

 the resolution of ratification, reasserting the rights of the Senate in this regard. 



"7 Idem. Also, pp. 7-8. 



1™ Ibid., p. 7. 



1™ Ibid., p. 8. 



