229 



nesses, by Presidents Eisenhower and Truman (in communications), 

 by 5 of 8 other persons with special knowledge or qualifications who 

 appeared as witnesses; a majority of the 25 public witnesses also 

 favored the treaty.^^'' The committee then took note of its own difficul- 

 ty in resolving differences of opinion on the part of highly qualified 

 technical witnesses who dealt with abstruse and highly classified mat- 

 ters. Alluding to questions as to Soviet superiority in high-yield weap- 

 ons, and to the three questions of penetration capability of missiles, 

 antiballistic missile development, and survival capability of missile 

 sites and systems as influenced by communications blackout caused by 

 nuclear blast and radiation, the report said : 



* * * The committee was presented with a great deal of highly technical 

 testimony, some of it sharply conflicting. For example, two distinguished scien- 

 tists challenged the testimony of a number of other distinguished scientists. It 

 was necessary for the committee to bear in mind that some witnesses had the 

 advantage of possessing all of the relevant information — technical and military 

 information, together with intelligence. These witnesses who were able to dis- 

 cuss the questions against so broad a background included the Secretaries of 

 State and Defense; the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; the Chair- 

 man of the Atomic Energy Commission ; the .Joint Chiefs of Staff ; and the Di- 

 rector of Defense Research and Engineering of the Department of Defense. 

 Each of these witnesses supported the treaty.^^ 



The report noted that questions by committee members had been 

 concentrated on the effects of the treaty "on the present and future 

 military balance of power." While some questions remained impre- 

 cisely or indeterminately answered — 



Nevertheless the committees did produce a record containing a large body of 

 information, much of it new and only recently top secret, that should give re- 

 assurance to the American people that the treaty represents a net advantage to 

 the United States; that the risks it contains are acceptable; that the nuclear 

 strike forces of the United States are superior in number and variety to those 

 of the Soviet Union. ^*- 



The report quoted witnesses and expressed the conclusions of the 

 committee as to the effect on penetration capability of U.S. missiles (it 

 posed no serious risk), on ABM development (unlikely in any event, 

 but not seriously inhibited), on survival capability of U.S. missile 

 sites (the U.S. deterrent was adequately secure against a first strike 

 by an adversary ).^^^ The risk of gain by the Soviet I'nion through 

 clandestine testing of nuclear devices or from planned surprise abroga- 

 tion was discounted as minor.^** 



Importance ascribed to military safeguards 



The report then turned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff "safeguards" 

 which it described, with an indication of the support by the adminis- 

 tration for their implementation. It concluded : 



It is the committee's clear understanding and opinion that the safeguards will 

 be maintained for just as long as the security of the United States and its 

 allies requires continued nuclear development and testing programs, together 

 with elaborate means of detecting and identifying the nuclear activities of other 

 nations." ^*^ 



'8c ibirt., pp. 8-9. 

 1^1 Ibid., p. 11. 

 's^Ihiri., p. 9. 

 ^M Ibid., pp. 11-18. 

 ^54 Ibid., p. 1 P. 

 i"* Ibid., p. 20. 



