230 



Findings as to proliferation^ Ploioshare, radiation^ military acce/ptance 



The treaty would not affect the "cooperative relationship between 

 the United States and the United Kingdom on nuclear weapons 

 matters." It would prohibit transfer of nuclear weapons, materials, 

 or information to any country that was testing or preparing to test 

 in any of the prohibited environments. It would not seriousl}^ inhibit 

 the Plowshare program.^*' 



With respect to the issue of radioactive fallout, the report observed 

 that most informed ojDinion considered it below the level of hazard 

 although "Geneticists have shown greater and more specific concern." 



It is feared [the report continued] that continued, or stepped up, atmosplieric 

 nuclear testing would increase the damage, genetic and otherwise, induced by 

 increased exposure by population groups to radiation. The treaty, in halting 

 the release into the atmosphere of radioactive fallout, offers a distinct benefit. 

 Moreover, great numbers of people around the world have been deeply disturbed 

 by the implications of this fallout. It may be that their concern has been highly 

 exaggerated. Nevertheless, it exists. The ability of this treaty to ease their 

 concern must also be regarded as a beneficial consequence."^ 



The final issue with which the report dealt was that of sufficient 

 and effective exposure of the treatymaking process to the views of the 

 JCS. It was concluded that the testimony of the Secretary of Defense 

 and the JCS "showed that the Chiefs of the miiformed services had 

 been intimately involved with the question." ^^^ 



Findings of Preparedness Investigating /Subcommittee 



The more narrowly focused interim report of the Preparedness In- 

 vestigation Subcommittee concluded that the treaty offered "serious — 

 perhaps even formidable— military and technical disadvantages to the 

 United States" by obstructing attainment of "the highest quality of 

 weapons of which our science and technology is capable." Any mili- 

 tary and teclmical advantages the treaty conferred would not "counter- 

 balance or outweigh the military and technical disadvantages." Mean- 

 while the Soviet Union would not be "similarly inhibited in those 

 areas of nuclear weaponrv' where we now deem them to be inferior." ^*^ 

 The subcommittee identified 19 "test objectives" which it considered 

 "desirable or necessary in any future U.S. nuclear test programs." ^^° 

 The subcommittee did not attempt to distinguish between "desirable" 

 and "necessary" items. However since some of the items enumerated 

 were virtually impossible of achievement and others were declared by 

 the JCS to be undesired, the force of this table is conjectural. Of the 

 items on the table, six were declared feasible under the treaty, one 

 partially so, and 12 not. With respect to most of the items prohibited by 

 the treaty, the United States possessed superior knowledge and experi- 

 ence to the Soviet Union and it is not clear that the treaty was disad- 

 vantageous on this account. The subcommittee seems to have been 

 generous in its assessment of Soviet capabilities to bring its weaponry, 

 in lagging areas, up to U.S. standards. 



Tlie report then tabulated eight "military disadvantages" of the 

 treaty, which — with accompanying exphmations deleted — were as 

 follows : 



i8« Idem. 



18T Ibid., pp. 21-22. 



188 Ibid., p. 22. 



189 Ibid., p. 2. 

 "o Ibid., p. 5. 



