As statement followed statement in support of the treaty, it be- 

 came evident that the necessary two-thirds vote was assured unless 

 opponents could discover a persuasive new objection. Most of the 

 debate repeated or enlarged upon points that had been presented 

 earlier in the hearings; periodicallj^ there were reflexes in the form 

 of supplementary statements and fact sheets supplied by the Ad- 

 ministration to satisfy or silence specific protests. Most of the opposi- 

 tion \"iews derived from the testimony before the Preparedness In- 

 vestigation Subcommittee, and from the conclusions it had drawn. 



Early in the debate, on Friday, September 13, Senator Stennis in- 

 troduced into the Record the first 14 pages of the interim report of 

 liis subcommittee, dated September 9. This report stressed the 

 "serious, and perhaps formidable, military- and technical disadvan- 

 tages" of the treaty and had expressed doubt that the treaty offered 

 military advantages.^^^ 



Preservation of the treaty from '"'' eroding'''' amendments 



Various amendments and understandings to qualify tlie treaty were 

 offered, mainly by treaty opponents. These seem generally to be char- 

 acterized by an effort to extract further concessions from the Soviet 

 Union, evidently under the impression that the Soviet Union wanted 

 the treaty more than did the United States and might be coerced into 

 paying more for it. Chief among these was a proposal by Senator Gold- 

 water to "make the effectiveness of the treaty contingent upon the 

 removal of the Soviet military presence in Cuba." ^^^ When the Senate 

 took up the Goldwater amendment on Monday, September 23, it was 

 tabbed by Senator Fulbright "inappropriate, unwise and irrelevant" 

 and the majority leader charged that its purpose was to destroy the 

 treaty. When the Goldwater amendment came to a vote it was defeated 

 ( 17 yeas, 75 nays, and 9 not voting) ?^^ 



Another amendment, by Senator Miller, proposed that the treaty not 

 become effective until the Soviet Union had paid up the arrears of its 

 financial obligations to the United Nations. This amendment was 

 withdrawn immediately after being introduced. ^°° However, the issue 

 was taken up by Senator Tower who demanded a record vote ; it was 

 rejected, 11 yeas, 82 nays, with 7 not voting.^"^ Senator Tower also 

 proposed a "reservation" to remand i\\Q treaty for renegotiation to 

 insert a provision for onsite inspection to verify compliance. The 

 Senate turned back this proposal by a vote of 16 yeas, 76 nays, with 

 8 not voting.-°2 



An "understanding" was proposed in absentia by Senator Long of 

 Louisiana, to clarify the expression "or any other nuclear explosion" 

 in the treaty as not meaning tlie restriction of nuclear weapons in 

 armed conflict. This action was tabled (in effect — without prejudice) 

 by a vote of 61 yeas, 33 nays, and 6 not voting."°^ 



Accordingly, the treaty went to the final vote almost entirely without 

 emendation or qualification by the Senate. Only tlie Russell amendment 

 to the resolution of ratification was added. And the purpose of this 



'"' Congressional Record (1964). pp. 16071-16075. 



i»s Congressional Record (Sept. 12. 1964), p. 16020. 



i»» Congressional Record (Sept. 2.3, 1964), pp. 16804-16S10. 



sw'Ibid.. pp. 16R17-1681S. 



=<" Ibid., p. 16S21. 



-"2 Ibid., p. 16821. This vote had considerable significance in that it indicated a hard 

 core support of the principle that inspection should be the sine qua non of any arms 

 control treaty. 



2«3 Ibid., r,. 16S32. 



