234 



action was merely to reassert the constitutional role of the Senate in 

 treatymaking. 



Protection of Senate prerogatives in treatymaking 



Two actions were entertained to establish the coequal status of the 

 Senate with the President in treatymakino:. One was an amendment 

 to the resolution of ratification, proposed and then withdrawn by 

 Senator Mundt. He had expressed objection to the procedure that had 

 been adopted by the original parties to the treaty in opening it up to 

 the signatures of other States before the Senate had an opportunity 

 to vote on it. This move he considered had imposed undue pressure on 

 the Senate to accede to the treaty without change. ^°^ 



Of greater consequence was an amendment by Senator Russell, chair- 

 man of the Armed Ser^aces Committee, September 12, that, he said, 

 "would make perfectly clear that any future amendments to this treaty 

 must be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent, as in the 

 case of the original treaty." ^"^ Subsequent discussion of the Russell 

 amendm.ent made evident that agreement had been reached among the 

 Senate leadership to accept it.-"'' A move to table was defeated, 8 

 yeas, 79 nays, and the amendment was adopted, 79 yeas, 9 nays.^"'' 



In addition to the acceptance of the Russell amendment, several 

 other efforts were made to satisfy the Senate that its participation in 

 the treaty process had been properly respected. An extensive account 

 was presented by Senator Humphrey of the numerous occasions on 

 which the Administration had consulted with the Senate on the test 

 ban treaty, both before and during the neo-otiations.-^'' A similar list 

 had earlier been supplied by the majority leader, September 20, in his 

 speech introducing the subject of the test ban to the Senate.^"^ Other 

 assurances were supplied by the Department of State that "no amend- 

 ment to the treaty can enter into force unless and until the United 

 States has deposited an instrument of ratification" ^^° and later, "The 

 TT.S. Government has never deposited an instrument of approval of 

 an amendment to a treaty without first going back to the Senate." ^^ 



However, the strongest assurance of the Senate's role was provided 

 in a letter from the President, read to the Senate by the minority leader, 

 September 11, in connection with his own endorsement of the treaty. 

 Altliough the terms of the letter dealt mainly with aspects of the 

 national security, the effect was that of a declaration of the President's 

 own "imderstanding" as to the terms under which the treaty would be 

 acceotable to the Senate."^ 



The abundant assurances the Senate received from the administra- 

 tion as to its past and future roles in treatymaking, plus its own 

 assertion in the Russell amendment, evidently sufficed to answer the 

 question. 



Preservation of the national security under the treaty 



The most fundamental question to be resolved was whether, on 

 balance, the political, military, and technological (enAdronmental) 



20* Ihid. (Sept. 23. 19R3>. pp. 16810-16816. 



205 Ibid., pp. 15968-1.5969. 



2o« Senator Dlrksen said (ibid., p. 168-36) : "There was a discussion of this matter -with 

 the distingruished Senator from Georgrla. • * •" And Senator Javits said (p. 16837 > 

 he realii^ed "that an arrana-ement has been made • * *." 



^ Ibid., pr>. 16841-16842. 



*«Ibld. (Sept. 13. 1964 >. pp. 16124-16126. 



=06 Tbid., pp. 16744-16745. 



"oihld., p. 1.5969. 



2" Ibid., p. 16003. 



^"^'Ibid., p. 15915. 



