235 



benefits under the treaty would be bought at too great a cost in 

 increased risk to the national security. There seemed to be no question 

 but that the treaty involved risk to the national security. But there 

 were also risks in failing to act. As Majority Leader Mansfield said : 



The truth is that there are risks in this as in any venture in foreign relations. 

 But I remind the Senate that there are also risks in failing to venture, in standing 

 still in a world which does not stand still for this or any other nation. And at 

 this moment in the world's time, the risks of a paralyzed uncertainty may be 

 far greater than those which might stem from the pursuit of this venture/** 



He sufiTOfested that there were eight criteria to be considered. These 

 were, in paraphrase: 



1. Might some "nth country" reach nuclear parity with the 

 United States by testing while'^the United States did not? 



2. Were U.S. atmospheric tests needed to neutralize some dem- 

 onstrated Soviet advantage? 



3. Would the treaty hamper the United States more than it 

 would the Soviet Union ? 



•i. Were there legal advantages under the treaty that the Soviet 

 Union could exploit but not the United States ? 



5. Conversely, did the treaty forbid the United States to do 

 something permitted to the Soviet Union ? 



6. Could the Soviet Union cheat on the treaty without being 

 detected ? 



7. If the Soviet Union did cheat, and was detected, would the 

 United States still be bound by the treaty ? 



8. Might surprise abrogation by the Soviet Union "so alter the 

 balance of military forces between the two nations as to increase 

 the risk of military attack upon us?" -" 



Other risks were cited by Senator Jackson (paraphrase) : 



There is the risk that we will relax and fall back into a state 

 which the Senate has learned to call euphoria. 



There may be a serious misjudgment of the basis for the change 

 in Soviet policy. 



It is generally conceded that the Communist Cliinese are now en- 

 gaged in a substantial nuclear weapons program and that in the 

 very near future they will be testing in the atmosphere. The ad- 

 vent of this new unchecked nuclear power may well require us 

 to withdraw from the agreement. 



It is altogether possible and indeed * * * probable that a group 



of nations, with Soviet encouragement, will seek to amend the 



treaty * * * so as to ban underground tests without inspection or 



with wholly inadequate arrangements for inspection. 



However, notwithstanding these risks, said Senator Jackson, he still 



found the treaty acceptable : 



Provided, that it is firm national policy to keep alert and to protect the present 

 and future credibility of our military deterrent ; and provided, furthermore, that 

 it is firm national policy to use the protections provided in the treaty when, as, 

 and if needed to guard vital national interests, including the right of withdrawal 

 and the right to exercise the veto by withholding our consent under article 2 

 to any attempt to change the treaty by amendment in a form imperiling our vital 

 interests.^ 



2isib1d., p. 154RR. 



"*■ Ibid., pp. 15462-15463. 



215 Congressional Record (Sept. 13. 1964), pp. 16078-16084, especially pp. 16078-16079. 



