236 



Much of the testimony in committee hearings had concerned this 

 question of risk ; and, particularly in the foreign relations hearings, on 

 how to reduce it. In the debate on the floor of the Senate, there was 

 some dissatisfaction with the stress placed by military witnesses on the 

 risks alone, rather than on the total question of risks and benefits. 

 Moreover, in the Military Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee 

 hearings, the risks were described by opponents of the treaty primarily 

 in terms of military or technological handicaps. Concerning this abun- 

 dant array of objections, Senator Humphrey protested: 



"We rely chiefly on the testimony of generals, colonels, majors, and scientists. 

 Yet we are supposed to understand the political, the economic, and the social 

 forces. Paradoxically, Senators are trying to decide on the size of weapons and 

 ballistic missiles, whereas they should be considering economics, history, and the 

 social and political forces which are at work in America and throughout the 

 world."' 



And Senator Morse was even more emphatic : 



If the time ever comes when American foreign policy is determined by Amer- 

 ican military authorities, we are on our way to inevitable war. I speak weighing 

 fully the meaning and implication of every word that I utter. If we permit the 

 American military to determine American foreign policy, or have the determining 

 voice in American foreign policy, we are on our way to an inevitable war and the 

 destruction of our country, for all of history points out that unless we keep mili- 

 tary forces in control, they will lead us to a manifestation of their art, which is 

 the art of war.'"' 



The four JCS reservations provided the focus for ways in which the 

 risks were to be obviated. There were several pledges by and to the 

 Senate, during the debate, that these provisos would be fully adhered 

 to. The fullest expression of this matter was in letters from President 

 Kennedy to the majority leader and the minority leader; Senator 

 Dirksen read his to the Members September 11. The President's pledges 

 in the letter may be paraphrased as follows : 



1. Underground testing will be vigorously pursued under the 

 test ban treaty, if it is approved. 



2. The United States will keep ready to resume atmospheric 

 testing, and will promptly resume such testing if the Soviet Union 

 should violate the treaty. 



3. Capability to detect clandestine nuclear tests will be im- 

 proved, 



4. The President of the United States is in no way limited by 

 the treaty in the use of nuclear weapons for the defense of itself 

 or its allies. 



5. If Cuba is "used either directly or indirectly to circumvent 

 or nullify this treaty, the United States will take all necessary 

 steps in response." 



6. Approval of the treaty will not "change the status" (i.e., re- 

 sult in U.S. recognition) of the "authorities in East Germany." 



T. The United States will maintain strong weapons laboratories. 



8. Development of peaceful uses of atomic explosions will be 

 diligently pursued: when such uses become practicable, "the 

 United States will seek international agreement under the treaty 

 to permit such explosions." -^® 



^" Ibid. (Sppt. 10. 1963), p. 15766. 

 21- Ibid. (Sept. IS, 19G7). p. 164S8. 

 "'8 Ibid., p. 1.5915. 



