237 



On the question as to the role of atomic weaponry in national secu- 

 rity, the debate in favor of the treaty appeared to rest on three un- 

 related and even incompatible points : 



(1) The nuclear arms race was itself a source of danger to the 

 national security. ^^^ 



(2) Progress in maintaining technological and numerical su- 

 periority of the United States in nuclear weaponry would not (and 

 should not) be halted by the treaty, 



(3) The preservation of U.S. military security depended on 

 other factors than nuclear weaponry.^-" 



Much less attention was given to the expected benefits from the 

 treaty than to the question of military technological risks. However, 

 there were a number of evident benefits, mainly in the political aspects, 

 and also a number of political disadvantages. Among the political 

 advantages claimed for the treaty were : 



The further estrangement of Kussian and Chinese Communist 

 States from each other ; 



The commitment of the Soviet Union to a policy of "peaceful 

 coexistence" ; 



The identification of nation states that accepted the U.S. policy 

 of searching for ways to "lessen the atomic peril and to promote 

 disarmament" ; 



The promotion of a climate of international agreement and 

 cooperation. 

 However, there were also a number of political disadvantages, such 

 as — ■ 



The further alienation of France, whose leadership had re- 

 solved on a couree of nuclear armament and could not or would 

 not subscribe to the treaty ; 



The threat of impairment of the NATO Alliance ; 

 The risk of a lessened vigor and initiative in the United States, 

 a condition that military leaders had termed "euphoria." ^^^ 

 Eventually the debate ended; the amendments, resolutions, under- 

 standings, and amendments were cleared away; and the vote was 

 taken. The Senate on September 24 approved the resolution favoring 

 ratification by a vote of 80 yeas, 19 nays, comfortably in excess of the 

 required two-thirds margin.-^^ 



319 As the majority leader put it : "This furious and frantic race for superiority In the 

 capacity to inflict nuclear devastation In mass or In caliperic refinement In the interests 

 of national security In the end has provided security to no nation. It has provided only the 

 assurance that the prospect of Immediate and massive destruction to others will be at 

 least as great as that prospect Is to ourselves" (Ibid., p. 15467). 



^° On this point, said Senator Fulbright : "Security * • * Is not merely a military and 

 technological commodity, but a combination of many elements, all of which must be taken 

 into account In the shaping of national policy." It was a "dangerous oversimplification to 

 regard national security solely in terms of weapons systems and military technology" 

 (Congressional Record (Sept. 9, 1964), pp. 15662-15663). 



2^ Virtually all administration witnesses supporting the treaty warned against 

 "euphoria." The word seemed to take on a special meaning in the hearings. Instead of re- 

 taining its dictionary significance as a sense of good feeling and ebullience, it began to 

 sound like a one-word precis of Tennyson's "Lotus-Eaters." Unfortunately, the State 

 Department presented no counterpart theory as to the need for keeping up its own intel- 

 lectual guard. Secretary Rusk, or a spokesman for his Department, might have suggested 

 that the objective of the United States in its foreign policy was to induce in the Com- 

 munist States at feast the same degree or greater of euphoria than prevailed in the United 

 States. 



2=2 Ibid. (Cong. Rec. (Sept. 24, 1964), pp. 16909-16910). 



