238 



VI. The AiTERMATii and the Significance of the Test Ban Treaty 



From a vantage point of 5 years later, it appears that the test ban 

 treaty has proved neither the great boon its strongest proponents 

 believed it to be, nor the path to early disaster foreseen by its strongest 

 adversaries. A mild condition of "detente"' had indeed prevailed be- 

 tween the Soviet Union and the United States, as foreseen among the 

 benefits of the treaty. Eelations between the two major Communist 

 states have indeed worsened, as was also foreseen. However, the 

 cohesion of the NATO alliance, and relations with France, as foreseen 

 by treaty opponents, may also have suffered. 



Testing of nuclear weapons has continued in tlie permitted environ- 

 ments by both the United States and the Soviet Union. France, and 

 the Communist Chinese have both conducted tests in the air, which the 

 treaty forbids. Most of the other nations of the world joined in the 

 treaty and have observed its terms. 



With the nomination of Senator Goldwater as a presidential candi- 

 date in 1964, since he had been an outspoken opponent of the treaty, 

 it became an issue in the 1964 campaign, but not a very salient one. 



Various nuclear explosions underground have occurred in the Plow- 

 share program, which has probably been impeded but not halted by 

 the treaty. 



The net level of atomic radiation in the environment has undoubt- 

 edly been reduced. 



The ABM development which the treaty was claimed to retard, if 

 not render impossible, has continued at a modest level of priority. It is 

 not evident that the treaty has affected its progress seriously: other 

 more significant factors have been the higher priority of other weap- 

 ons, and other military requirements. 



It is probable that the assassination of President Kennedy only 2 

 months after the ratification of the test ban treaty affected the impetus 

 of exploitation of the detente it had generated. The escalation of the 

 conflict in Vietnam has further obscured the situation, insofar as con- 

 tinuation of the detente is concerned. It has also dramatically illus- 

 trated the point made by some advocates of the treaty that nuclear 

 weaponry might shape the nature of military confrontations but would 

 be unlikely to be used to resolve them. 



Expectations of President Kennedy for the treaty 



For President Kennedy's own assessment of the implications of the 

 treaty it is necessary to rely mainly on his statements and messages 

 before the Senate action was completed, plus the few references he 

 made during the short interval thereafter before his assassination. 

 There is no question but that he attached great importance to the 

 treaty as a symbol. The President certainly hoped that it would pro- 

 vide a turning point, a way to break out of the circle of fear, distrust, 

 conflict, insistence on strength, demands for guarantees, insistence on 

 the unchanging and implacable hostility and activist role of the Soviet 

 Union, and the futile search by the United States to bring back the 

 total security of the preatomic period. 



The President probably also hoped the debate on the test ban treaty 

 would inform the Congress and the electorate on some apparent 

 propositions applicable to the futile and dangerous nuclear arms race. 

 These propositions are, in sum : 



