239 



That the offense, technologically speaking, could always beat 

 the defense. 



That there could be no tecluiological assurance of security. 



That no new scientific weapon was likely to provide an easy 

 route to the restoration of the military preeminence enjoyed by 

 the United States in the short period between Hiroshima and the 

 exploding of the first Soviet nuclear device. 



That national security for both the United States and the Soviet 

 Union had continued to deteriorate even as the cax^ability of each 

 state to inflict destruction on the other had continued to increase. 



That there could be no guarantee that the Soviet Union would 

 not violate or abrogate the test ban treaty as it had violated so 

 many others in the past when abrogation proved more in its 

 short-run interest than continued observation. 



But, that miless the Soviets were afforded opportunities to 

 demonstrate their good faith — preferably in ways involving little 

 risk to the United States — the circle of fear and mistrust could 

 never be broken. 



Future guidance afforded hy the treaty debates 



One useful product of the Senate's consideration of the test ban 

 treaty is that it provides a format for future arms control and disarma- 

 ment treaties, and their approval. By its very comprehensiveness, its 

 minute and exhaustive nature, the Senate's examination of the 1963 

 pact gives future Administrations a splendid array of criteria by which 

 to measure its treatymaking in the field of arms control and disarma- 

 ment. Future Administrations might expect that their treaties will be 

 tested as follows : 



( 1 ) Is it in the best interest of the United States ? 



(2) What assurance is there that a major adversary who has 

 cosigned will not trick the United States by a surprise abroga- 

 tion 'I And what arrangements can be made by the United States 

 to abrogate promptly and effectively if an adversary does? 



(3) Is the treaty enforceable? IVliat assurance is there that 

 it is not being violated by stealth, and what reliable arrange- 

 ments are being undertaken to be sure about this ? 



(4) Have military leaders participated in the preparatory 

 stages, and in the actual negotiation of the treaty ? Do they approve 

 of it from the military point of view — or, at least, do they con- 

 sider the military disadvantages tolerable in relation to explicit 

 "broader" political advantages ? 



(5) What tangible gains does the treaty afford the United 

 States? 



(6) Can a reasonable case be made that the treaty benefits the 

 United States at least as much as it does the Soviet Union — and 

 preferably more? 



(7) Have all technical and scientific questions been fully 

 explored ? Is there a good sound answer to every substantial reser- 

 vation that the scientific community might raise ? And do a pre- 

 ponderant number of the Nation's most respected senior scientists 

 favor the treaty on scientific grounds ? 



(8) Has any opening been provided that will afford opportu- 

 nity for exploitation by an ingenious and persistent adversaiy to 

 the peril of the United States ? 



