242 



of the people who were supposed to adopt them ; to identify the particular agents 

 in each village, local, or national society who were willing and able to he inno- 

 vators and whose examples would be followed by others * * *." 



The Peace Corps was designed to supplement ongoing technical 

 assistance programs, particularly the Point IV program, not only by 

 direct technological transfer at the community level, but also by giving 

 specihc attention to the cultural dimension in technical assistance. 

 Congressional sujDport appears to have responded to both aspects. 

 Development of this understanding was attributable to the special 

 efforts made by the Peace Corps at the outset in presenting the Con- 

 gress with an objective overview of the problems to be encountered in 

 implementing a program to transfer teclmology at the grassroots 

 level. 



The primary mission of the Peace Corps was to provide develop- 

 ing comitries with an infusion of youthful and flexible Americans 

 who could familiarize urban and rural peoples with a technological 

 orientation — with the skills of teclmical training and with the activi- 

 ties of a teclinically developed society. It was designed to pro\ide 

 manpower to work with and teach these peoples how to solve the basic 

 problems of underdevelopment — to purify water, devise educational 

 programs, build bridges, organize administrations, contrive proce- 

 dures, wash clothes, vaccinate, and — in short — imbibe some of the 

 "do it yourself" spirit congenial in the American culture. 



An effective program needed a highly structured underpinning. 

 Americans who would serve overseas would have to be properly se- 

 lected and trained. They w^ould have to be taught to understand the 

 complex cultural, economic, political, and technological obstacles to 

 development. They would have to be familiar with the basic technical 

 tools of the specific tasks they would face : to understand the mores 

 and traditions of the societies to which they would be sent and to com- 

 municate with its peoples. 



The program that resulted had several shortcomings : neither the 

 Congress nor the administration had explored intensively the subject 

 of specific technical training and supporting research, and the l^ro- 

 gram did not call for adequate followup of results. Xotwithstanding 

 these fairly secondary exceptions, it appears to have been that intended 

 by its authors, and that sought by the Administration. 



II. Identification of the Issue 



The notion of a technological army of youth to serve at the grass- 

 roots to demonstrate skills and techniques to people in developing na- 

 tions was long in germinating. The idea was linked to William James, 

 early 20th century philosopher,"* and refined by Heinz Rollman, an 

 American industrialist, who proposed a "Peace Army of 5 million 

 American men and women who would be sent to the world's under- 

 privileged, imderdeveloped countries." ^ 



3 Theodore Geiger and Roger D. Hansen. "The Role of Information in Deoisionniaking on 

 Foreign Aid," in "The Study of Policy Formation," edited by Raymond A. Bauer and Ken- 

 neth J. Gergen, (New York, the Free Press, 1968), p. 355. 



^U.S. Peace Corps, "Peace Cori)s Presentation of FY 1962 Program to U.S. Congress," 

 May 29, 1961 (Washington, mlmeo. 1961). p. 1. 



■^statement of Heinz Rollman. In U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 

 The Peace Corps, hearings before the * * * on S. 2000 (A bill to provide for a Peace 

 Corps to help the peoples of interested countries and areas in meeting their needs for skilled 

 manpower), .Tune 22 and 2.3, 1961, S7th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, U.S. Government 

 Printing Office, 1961), pp. 124-134. 



