261 



VII. Conclusion 



Although the Peace Corps proposal of 1961 encountered mild skepti- 

 cism in both Democratic and Republican quarters, there were at work 

 strong forces in its favor. The enthusiastic tenor of public opinion, the 

 Antality of the new Administration, and the relatively low initial cost of 

 the phin helj^ed insure legislative success. However, congressional re- 

 ceptivity to this proposal, and the eventual marshaling of legislative 

 support for it were largely attributable to the Administration's inclina- 

 tions to secure preliminary information and to consult fully with indi- 

 vidual Members of Congress and with the relevant committees. This 

 was a well -planned procedure, for several Members of Congress them- 

 selves had initially authored similar proposals. It is also evident that 

 the intensive analysis done by President Kennedy's staff before inaugu- 

 ration and Shriver's staff after January, coupled with the strategy of 

 presenting Congress with a well-run and established program, helped 

 insure passage. 



Nevertheless, there were two major informational requisites for 

 legislative success. First, the Administration had to convince the Con- 

 gress that this new people-to-people approach to foreign relations could 

 be advantageous. The Peace Corps had to convince Congress that this 

 new foreign aid program, virtually unrelated to ongoing programs of 

 technical assistance or the transfer of technology (particularly military 

 technology), could make a positive contribution to the national secu- 

 rity. The Administration's efforts to devise a small and unassuming 

 program, without guaranteeing immediate positive results in economic 

 development and improvement in foreign relations, were apparently 

 successful. 



Second, the Peace Corps had to familiarize the Congress with some 

 of the details of the developmental tasks envisioned. The Congress was 

 not told that thousands of trained and willing Americans were ready 

 to serve for 2 years in some jungle slum or barren desert. The Congress 

 was provided with information detailing the complex cultural variables 

 which would make it difficult for Americans to modify opinions and 

 attitudes and to teach a technological orientation to peoples of develop- 

 ing nations. The Congress was presented with details of the immensity 

 of differences between traditional and modern cultures; with detailed 

 information about the health hazards and cultural variants volunteers 

 would encounter. Similarly the Congress was presented with detailed 

 information about the steps that would be taken to insure the program's 

 success: highly selective recruitment, intensive language training; and 

 education in the culture, traditions, histoi*y and technical needs of the 

 country to which the volunteer would be sent. Three and one-half 

 months after introduction of the legislation, Congress, with only minor 

 technical modifications granted the requested program and gave the 

 Peace Corps a mandate to begin. In order to explain and implement a 

 technical assistance program accounting for cultural variables, the 

 executive branch made considerable use of social scientists in fashion- 

 ing its program. Undoubtedly their efforts and conclusions were 

 filtered to the Congress through testimony and helped in the fashioning 

 of the necessary legislative consensus. 



The Congress, and individual Members, had undertaken their own 

 efforts to obtain social science advice independent of the executive 



