485 



Assessment. — Committee review and pressure jjenerated by it 

 strengthened NBS research function and reduced its activity in the 

 testing of consumer products. It ended direct NBS contacts with inter- 

 ested parties to tests. Also, it freed the vendor to merchandise his 

 product. 



Commentary. — Committee expertise was unequal to the task of sci- 

 entific interpretation of vokiminous and detailed technical test data. 

 Relevance of much of the evidence was questionable. Limited juris- 

 diction of the committee obstructed consideration of the political ques- 

 tion at stake: whether a Government research laboratory should be 

 used to support regulation of advertising or protection of the consumer 

 against fraud. The final result was that Government interest in such 

 regulation was somewhat reduced. 



CASE TWO : THE POINT IV PROGRAM 



BacJcground. — After "World "War II, U.S. policy called for positive 

 efforts to encourage development of lagging economies to halt the 

 spread of communism. Historically, U.S. experience with aid to devel- 

 oping countries had been meager. 



Prohlem. — Although restoration of war-torn economies in Europe 

 had been successful at moderate cost to the United States, the costs of 

 effecting corresponding gains in the many lagging economies of the 

 world in the same way would have been prohibitive; an alternative 

 approach was needed. 



Acress to Congress. — President Truman, in his 1949 inaugural ad- 

 dress, proposed a "bold new program"' to export technological ex- 

 pertise to developing countries. Subsequently, State Department staff 

 members prepared studies and plans to flesh out the President's pro- 

 posal. These were submitted to Congress. 



The facts. — Two basic concepts were evolved; one (mainly in the 

 Senate) called for the loan of technologically trained individuals to 

 developing countries, and the other (mainly in the House of Repre- 

 sentatives) stressed the underwriting of private capital investment 

 abroad. The program was represented as short range. Proposals in the 

 Senate for background studies to lay the groundwork for a soundly 

 based, long-range program were rejected. The assumption was gen- 

 erally accepted by both the Congress and the administration that the 

 transfer of new technology to a developing country with a distinctly 

 different culture offered no difficulties. It was also believed that no 

 extensive research was needed to design a successful program of for- 

 eign aid to these countries. 



Sources. Mnds of techm-cal m formation for Congress. — 

 State Department witnesses: outlines of 18 program areas, with esti- 

 mated funds and personnel requirements; recipient countries 

 identified. 

 Other administration witnesses : Reaffirmed expertise and availability 



of U.S. technicians with experience in overseas development. 

 Private businessmen: Opposed Government participation in foreign 

 area economic development, asked for tax incentives or guarantees 

 of private capital investment abroad, and offered assurances of their 

 experience in foreign area development. 



