487 



dealt with the physical, biological, and medical sciences; it did not 

 discuss the social ^sciences. When the social science issue was raised 

 by President Truman, the science community in general was not en- 

 tliusiastic; inclusion of the social sciences within NSF was viewed as 

 a possible obstacle to congressional acceptance of the NSF itself. The 

 physical scientists appeared to favor a separate agency for the social 

 and behavioral sciences. There was some sentiment in Congress for 

 an omnibus scientific agency, and a bill to this effect was reported by 

 the Senate subcommittee that had held hearings on the issue. How- 

 ever, after a conference of Senate leaders with Dr. Bush and some of 

 his associates, the full committee dropped the mandatory social science 

 provision in favor of a permissive arrangement. A revised bill incor- 

 porating the compromise was reported favorably. Amending proposals 

 were beaten back in the Senate, and the House concurred. Although 

 the legislation failed of enactment from 1946 until 1950 (for unrelated 

 reasons) , all subsequent bills reported or voted on during this period 

 adhered to the compromise formula for the social sciences, including 

 the bill that became law in 1950. 



Sources^ kinds of technical information for Congress. — 

 The President of the National Academy of Sciences opposed any 

 Government agency to sponsor basic science; as an alternative, he 

 favored tax credits to encourage expanded scientific effort by private 

 industiy. 

 Leading personalities in the disciplines of the physical, biological, and 

 medical sciences were strongly favorable to creation of an agency to 

 sponsor basic science ; lukewarm on inclusion of the social science- ; 

 questioned whether it was possible to define these as "sciences." 

 (They lagged behind other sciences.) 

 Leading personalities in the social science disciplines suggested that 

 because they lagged behind other sciences, the social sciences needed 

 Government support most. They were needed to identify needs for 

 new technology, and to assess the effects on society of technological 

 change. There were many important "social inventions" but these 

 rarely received the kinds of recognition or rewards given to inventors 

 in the physical science disciplines. 

 Military spokesmen gave mild support for applied social sciences as 

 usefiil in the development of hardware systems, and as important 

 for the intellig:ence function of strategic assessment of foreign mili- 

 tary capabilities. 



Decision. — Social sciences were not to be included explicitly in the 

 new NSF at the outset. The agency would be permitted to add oth^r 

 divisions (including one for the social sciences) when study by NSF 

 established the need for them. 



Decision locus.- — Informal conference of leading physical scientists 

 with chairmen of Senate Committees on Military Affairs and Com- 

 merce devised a compromise that was subsequently incorporated in a 

 conmiittee bill and reported. The plan was ajDproved by the Senate by 

 a record vote, and concurred in by the House in subsequent actions. 



Assessment. — Congressional skepticism as to the scientific method- 

 ology of the social sciences had much to do with the decision. Testi- 

 mony bj' the social scientists had apparently not relieved these uncer- 

 tainties. The disciplines and the products of the applied social sciences 



