488 



were not clearly distinguished from the routine considerations of the 

 Congress itself. It was not made clear which was "science" and which 

 was merely "commonsense." Physical scientists had more concrete 

 evidence of the potential value of their contributions. 



C ormnentary . — ^Mistrust of the social sciences still persists. How- 

 ever, NSF early resolved the question of the relevance of the disci- 

 plines in its program. Selective sponsorship of unmistakably "scien- 

 tific" social science projects led to the expansion of this phase of XSF 

 acti^dty, and probably furtliered its eventual formal endorsement by 

 Congress. Initial congressional reservations also had a salutary effect 

 on the social sciences themselves, resulting in an increase in the rigor of 

 their methodology. Finally, the apj^lication of scientific methodologies 

 to social problems in many expanding fields of Government activity 

 stimulated the various social science disciplines. By 1969, the role of 

 the social sciences was beginning to be acknowledged generally as 

 important in the support of the other sciences, and in teclmological 

 goal-setting, development, assessment, transfer, and control. 



CASE foue: project camelot 



B(juckground. — The foreign policy of the United States after World 

 War if involved support for governments of developing countries 

 threatened with forcible overthrow by internal insurgent forces led by 

 Communist-trained cadres and aided by Communist-supplied muni- 

 tions. U.S. military preparedness to assume these obligations required 

 advance indication of areas likely to seek U.S. help. 



Problem. — What policy should be established for Government use 

 of applied social science outside of U.S. territory ? 



Access to 6'onp'/'e.s-.§.— Newspaper revelation that military-sponsored 

 research had resulted in criticism of the United States prompted 

 congressional investigation by the House Committee on Foreign 

 Affairs. 



The facts. — Project Camelot was a study of political instability and 

 potential for revolution in developing countries. It was administered 

 by the special operations research office, (SORO), at The American 

 University, with the cooperation of social scientists elsewhere. Disclo- 

 sure of SORO's activities in Chile provoked criticism by public opin- 

 ion media in that country. The U.S. Ambassador cabled home an 

 inquiry about the project. The inquiry became public. Members of 

 Congress expressed concern as to the potential for disruption of U.S. 

 foreign policy inherent in the kind of operation represented by 

 Camelot. Subsequently the issue was broadened into an examination by 

 the Congress of the policy questions involved. In Congress, the issues 

 were as to the need for interagency coordination, and the proper spon- 

 sorship of applied research in the social sciences abroad. Among the 

 social scientists, the issues were as to the ethics of performing un- 

 disclosed research, military sponsorship, and the Government-science 

 relationship. 



Sources, hinds of technical information for Congress. — Military 

 research administrators asserted the need for research in social and 

 political conditions abroad. Spokesmen for the State Department 

 attested to lack of interagency coordination. 



