491 



Decision locus. — House Appropriations Committee; decision en- 

 dorsed by Conference Committee on Appropriations and accepted by 

 both Houses of Congress. 



Assessment. — Mohole had floundered between objectives — generat- 

 ing; controversy among the scientists themselves, weakening the case 

 for the project," and raising questions about the validity of "big science" 

 under Government sponsorship. 



Commentary. — Early confusions resulting from the divided man- 

 agement of the project persisted; this may perhaps be attributed to 

 the absence of close and continuous congressional scrutiny. The man- 

 agement goal of the contractor was too narrow to allow for a proper 

 scope of research. Precisely why costs rose so steeply was never ex- 

 plained : original underestimates were explained away as having been 

 made by enthusiastic scientists rather than by qualified engineers. Con- 

 gressional opposition produced an increased but belated flow of sub- 

 stantiating information. A possible interpretation of the project is 

 that ''big science" needs to be insulated from the profit motive — that 

 it is safer to draw ujDon consortia of universities or research founda- 

 tions for the management of such projects. A stronger case for the proj- 

 ect might have been made had the Congress insisted on having detailed 

 plans for full exploitation of the projected hardware to yield all pos- 

 sible scientific values, and if the relevance of the design for such ex- 

 ploitation had been fully explained. 



CASE six: the test baiSt treaty 



Background. — Numerous test explosions of atomic devices had in- 

 creased the level of radioactivity in the atmosphere. The intensifying 

 arms race, and the possibility of nuclear proliferation, prompted con- 

 sideration of the utility of unrestricted development of weapons of 

 mass destruction. Efforts at arms control agreement since 1946 had 

 been unfruitful. 



Prohlem. — lYliether the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty should be 

 approved for ratification : whether the military-technological inhibi- 

 tions prescribed in the treaty contained unacceptable risks, or were ade- 

 quately overmatched by the expected political and diplomatic benefits 

 of the treaty. 



Access to Congress. — Members of the Senate had periodically volun- 

 teered views on test ban issues and had participated in deliberations 

 with the Administration leading up to the treaty negotiations ; how- 

 ever, the formal point of access was the President's request for Senate 

 approval of ratification of the treaty. 



The facts. — The treaty was considered in the Foreign Relations 

 Committee, while separate hearings were held by a subcommittee of 

 the Senate Military Affairs Committee. 



Sources, kinds of technical informrttion for Congress.- — Before the 

 Foreign Relations Committee, the Secretary of State described the 

 terms of the treaty, the Secretary of Defense gave assurances of its 

 safety, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission told the com- 

 mittee that much promising; research would still be permitted under it, 

 and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) found it acceptable, pro\dded 

 four sets of safeguards were maintained. A number of scientific wit- 



