492 



nesses also testified, mostly in favor. Their main points were that viola- 

 tions of the treaty could be detected outside the violatino- country, that 

 adequate offensive weapons could be developed without further testing 

 of warheads, and that defensive weapons had small prospect of success. 

 One opponent, Dr. Teller, said he opposed it because of its inhibiting 

 effect on the development of defensive weapons, weapons testing, and 

 peaceful uses of atomic explosives. In the hearings before the Military 

 Affairs Subcommittee, witnesses were technical or military. Emphasis 

 was on ways in which the treaty would impair prospects for future 

 U.S. weapons development. In both sets of hearings the public appre- 

 hensions about fallout were discounted as exaggerated. 



Decision. — After being favorably reported by the Foreign Relations 

 Committee, the treaty was debated in the Senate for 3 weeks (during 

 which the Military Affairs Subcommittee recommended against it), 

 and was then approved by a vote of 80 to 19. However, during these 

 proceedings, the opinion was expressed by several members that the 

 approval of the treaty was a foregone conclusion. 



Decision locus. — Formally, by the Senate. 



Assessment. — Approval of the treaty may have paved the way for 

 other arms agreements to ease international tensions and reduce the 

 intensity of the arms race. It established criteria for acceptability of 

 arms control agreements. Compliance probably resulted in some re- 

 duction in fallout. Implementation of the JCS safeguards required a 

 substantial and continuing outlay. 



Commentary. — The process of approving the treaty did not solve 

 the problem of equating its effects on military technology with its 

 effects on political or diplomatic status of the United States. It revealed 

 obstacles in the obtaining of technological information through the 

 filter of security classification. It also revealed the difficulty of obtain- 

 ing concrete evidence of political and diplomatic benefits of an arms 

 treaty. 



CASE seven: the peace corps 



Background. — Over the years there had been various proposals to 

 enlist into voluntary public sen-ice the motivation and zeal of young 

 people — especially recent college graduates. Foreign service was a par- 

 ticularly appealing feature. 



Problem,. — Could foreign aid programs be effectively supplemented 

 by a minimum-budget program to send young volunteers abroad as 

 technological missionaries to developing countries ? 



Access to Congress. — The Peace Corps proposal received initial im- 

 petus within Congress itself ; later, after the Corps had been established 

 by Executive Order, the President asked Congress to give it legislative 

 sanction. 



Ths facts.— The Peace Corps idea gathered currency and substance 

 through numerous speeches by Members of Congress, studies by ad 

 hoc panels at the request of candidate John F. Kennedy, and a re- 

 search study requested in 1959 by Congress and performed by the 

 Eesearch Foundation at Colorado State University (CSU). It aroused 

 much interest on many college campuses. An Executive Order of the 

 new President created an agency to demonstrate the concept in actual 

 operation, and also to supply information to Congress when the 



