496 



placed 58 research contracts and was concentrating its efforts on de- 

 velopmental engineering of five pilot plant projects. 



Sources, kinds of technical wformation for Congress. — From the 

 Department of the Interior, four members of the staff of the Bureau of 

 Mines, one from the U.S. Geological Survey, and the Assistant Sec- 

 retary for jNIineral Resources, provided historical and technical data, 

 a research plan, and a survey of U.S. coal reserves. Field hearings 

 drew testimony from 35 witnesses, including 13 coal producers, five 

 spokesmen for local chambers of commerce, four officials of State gov- 

 ernments, four representatives of academic institutions, three labor 

 leaders, three coal association representatives, and an electric utility 

 spokesman. At concluding hearings in Washington, staff members 

 of the Bureau of Mines returned to testify again; other testimony 

 was taken from three railroad officials and two spokesmen for the Na- 

 tional Coal Association. The evidence and testimony indicated that 

 the coal industry was financially ill equipped to fund its own research, 

 that Federal research had not significantly improved coal marketing 

 or product development, that there was a compelling need for a 

 greatly expanded research and development program for the coal 

 industry, and that Federal funding was necessary to sponsor it. The 

 coal industry itself proposed an independent agency as the solution. 

 Decision. — Action was delayed in hope that the Department of the 

 Interior would take action under its existing authority to exj^and re- 

 search in coal utilization. "When no such expansion occurred, a bill 

 was passed by both Houses in 1959 to estalilish an independent agency 

 for this purpose; it was vetoed by the President as administratively 

 unsuitable, and in 1960 agreement was reached on a substitute 

 measure. ' 



Decision locus. — The legislative process, in response to a decision 

 on inaction in the executive branch. 



Assessment. — The Special Subcommittee on Coal Research pro- 

 vided the basic data on which the subsequent legislation depended. It 

 presented a hypothesis as to the need for action, and challenged spe- 

 cialists in the administration to propose a program. From the regions 

 most concerned, the subcommittee obtained sociological data, and 

 opinions as to the political urgency of action. A broad spectrum of 

 coal producers, consumers, and technological authorities identified 

 the range of research actions that might be taken and the preferred 

 form of management. Technologists in the industry and academic au- 

 thorities engage-d in coal research advised the subcommittee as to the 

 scope and possible economic consequences of a vigorous program of 

 applied research in coal. Finally, the subcommittee presented an op- 

 portunity for both the specialists of tlie Bureau of Mines and the as- 

 sociation of the coal producers to react to the evidence and refine their 

 own earlier testimony. 



Commentary. — It is probably too early to draw any firm conclu- 

 sions as to the contributions of OCR in meeting the objectives for 

 the coal industry identified in 1957 by the special subcommittee. If 

 enough of the pilot plant programs of the agency mature into econom- 

 ically practicable and successful industries, then it might l^ecome the 

 prototype for other public investment in the large-scale application of 

 science and technology to the resources of nature. Although contro- 



