497 



versy arose during the hearings, and in subsequent reviews of the 

 operation of OCK, as to whetlier applied researcli should be de- 

 liberately short range in character, subsequent experience suggests 

 that all new teclinology matures on its own built-in time schedule, and 

 that attempts to force it more quickly to exploitation tend to be 

 costly and wasteful. Evidence is still not available that the impact of 

 applied research can be beneficial to the coal industry in measurable 

 terms. 



CASE ten: the salk vaccine 



Background. — Infantile paralysis or poliomyelitis afflicted increas- 

 ing numbers of people in the early 1950's. Originally considered a 

 childhood disease, it was attacking increasing numbers of yoimg 

 adults. Polio reached an annual peak in midsumer, sometimes ap- 

 proacliing epidemic proportions. Prognosis tended to be increasingly 

 mifavorable with increased age of victims. A national voluntary cam- 

 paign, f mided by the annual March of Dimes, had been maintained 

 since the early 1930's to prevent and treat the disease, and rehabilitate 

 crippled victims. 



Frohlem. — The Congress was asked whether Government assistance 

 should be provided to make a promising new polio vaccine available on 

 a national basis before the midsummer peak in the disease. The double 

 issue was raised : (1) how should the vaccine be distributed? (2) was it 

 safe ? 



Access to Congress. — ^At first, the President recommended only a 

 limited Federal role in distribution of the vaccine; later, upon receiv- 

 ing the recommendations of a Department of Health, Education, and 

 Welfare (DHEW) National Advisory Committee, he submitted a 

 revised proposal for Federal funding of distribution without a means 

 test. 



The facts. — Successful testing of the Salk vaccine had been an- 

 nounced in April 1955 over national television. It was declared safe 

 and 60 to 90 percent effective as a preventive, on the basis of a na- 

 tional test involvmg nearly 2 million children in M States. The mamier 

 of announcement was unorthodox ; usual medical procedure was to cir- 

 culate reports about new medical experience or tests in the professional 

 journals so as to bring professional criticism to bear systematically on 

 claims of improved procedures. Immediately after the announcement 

 of the test results. Secretary Hobby, of DHEW, annomiced that six 

 manufacturers had been licensed to produce it. Dr. James Shannon, 

 Assistant Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), rec- 

 ommended tightening of Public Health Service (PHS) safety stand- 

 ards for the new vaccine. Some of the vaccine was found to produce 

 polio in those inoculated. All manufacturing and distribution was 

 halted pending a hastily undertaken PHS investigation. The cause was 

 eventually attributed to improper manufacturing methods used by one 

 producer whose vaccine was withdrawn from the program. PHS tight- 

 ened safety standards, and manufacturing and distribution were 

 resumed. In the Congress, bills were introduced in May 1955, offering 

 the alternatives of : grants to the States to aid in vaccine distribution, 

 arrangements for Federal distribution, and regulatory controls on vac- 

 cine distribution and use. Three committees held hearings on the bills. 



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