and fin permits; hydroelectric licenses; operating schedules for Federal 

 projects, such as dams and diversionary works; waste assimilation capabilities 

 of rivers and streams; environmental impact assessments; mitigation efforts; 

 navigation facilities; recreation; land management planning; State programs 

 for setting initial instream flow standards; the design and implementation of 

 general State instream flow programs; initiating instream flow legislation; 

 and in denials of water rights based on instream flow studies. 



Even where instream uses are designated as beneficial, and legal oppor- 

 tunities provided for their protection, the institutional processes involved 

 often present major obstacles to achieve adequate protection for instream 

 values. The problem seems to be more than just a question of which is the 

 more "beneficial" use. While it is true that instream uses are easier to 

 protect if they are legitimized by State law, when this is not the case, other 

 opportunities exist for their protection. Such opportunities are provided in 

 Federal project construction and operation; Federal water rights; endangered 

 species protection; wild and scenic rivers management; Federal Clean Water Act 

 planning; the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act; and various State laws and 

 protective programs. 



Although one of the most basic elements of instream flow determinations 

 concerns the allocation of water among competing users, and hence "water 

 rights," the issue is much more complex than this implies. Solutions are far 

 from simple, no matter what system of water allocation is at work. Conflict 

 initially arises because a multitude of public agencies and private organiza- 

 tions strive to achieve a widely diverse set of goals (Doerksen and Lamb 1974; 

 Lamb and Meshorer 1983). Each instream flow problem tends to be defined, 

 then, by a number of factors, including: the various State and Federal laws 

 that are called into play by the nature of the problem; the interactions of 

 various groups attempting to achieve their own objectives; the particular set 

 of technological problems that need to be resolved; the type of field studies 

 and analyses to be conducted; and the political and institutional circumstances 

 involved. 



Allocation of water supplies, both underground and surface, is achieved 

 through a complex arrangement of statutes, regulations, and permit systems 

 carried out by numerous organizations created at all three governmental levels. 

 To date, there has been little effort in developing and coordinating a single 

 regulatory system to control water distribution and use. At the National 

 level, the mechanisms for control are fragmented not only across the three 

 branches (executive, legislative, and judicial), but scattered within each 

 branch as well. For example, in Congress alone, 41 House committees and sub- 

 committees, along with 31 in the Senate, all have some authority over National 

 water policy planning. Furthermore, four different Federal agencies, each 

 located in different departments, have major responsibilities for water manage- 

 ment (Rosenbaum 1985). (These include the Bureau of Reclamation (Interior); 

 the Soil Conservation Service (Agriculture); the Army Corps of Engineers 

 (Defense); and the Tennessee Valley Authority.) Although such dispersion of 

 responsibility and authority obscures the interrelatedness of the various 

 policy areas and obstructs coordinated planning, new statutes are written and 

 existing statutes implemented in such a way that fragmentation and inconsis- 

 tency seem inevitable. The ambiguity that results is seen by some as 



