which a choice between competing in- and out-of-stream values needed to be 

 made. The Department of Ecology was caught in the middle. This happens 

 frequently in water use conflicts (Lord 1984). Nonetheless, an official 

 standard was set, based on the Department of Fisheries' final recommendation. 

 Many, if not all, of these facts would have been revealed in a traditional 

 assessment of the conflict by any of the organizations involved. 



This is because traditional assessments of instream flow issues tend to 

 focus upon surveys of: (1) the statutory environment in which use decisions 

 are to be made, (2) the policies that have developed within -that context, 

 (3) the principal actors, and (4) the institutional framework involved. 

 Typical questions addressed include: What statutes apply? Which organizations 

 have what degree and type of authority to participate? Who makes the final 

 decision — and on what basis? What policies have been developed? What organi- 

 zational structure is in place, if any, for implementation, monitoring, and 

 enforcement? What sanctions apply? The traditional approach has frequently 

 been used to examine water issues, either before or after the fact, and is a 

 crucial first step toward understanding the boundaries within which those 

 seeking to protect instream flows must operate. Many traditional analyses 

 have been undertaken because of the obvious need to document the existing 

 legal and institutional arrangements within a given State or region of the 

 country. Case studies have also been conducted that attempt to assess the 

 degree to which laws have been effective. These case studies tend to be of a 

 critical nature and more often than not suggest ways in which improvements can 

 be made. 



In a case like the Cedar River, a formal analysis of this type would have 

 been useful in discovering and explicitly recognizing the basic legal facts 

 and organizations involved. Such analyses are frequently recommended (Minton 

 et al. 1980; Ingram et al . 1984; Cortner and Marsh 1985). Traditional 

 institutional analysis, however, would not have predicted the end result, non- 

 compliance and a never-ending series of negotiations. Nor would it have moved 

 the analyst towards developing strategies useful in avoiding such a scenario. 



The Cedar River case demonstrates the type of problems that can arise 

 when a single State agency, without adequately consulting the other impacted 

 organizations (in this case, the City of Seattle), attempts to establish and 

 enforce flows through the promulgation of regulations. Each organization 

 typically pursues its own interest, without consideration of the other 

 interests involved. The ultimate decision reflects either the mutual accommo- 

 dation of competing positions or the inability, as in this example, of the 

 parties to reach a satisfactory agreement. One of the tests of a successful 

 agreement is the degree of compliance that follows. A high degree of compli- 

 ance is much more likely to occur when all parties are at least partially 

 satisfied with the agreement (Lee 1982; Wilds 1985). 



Traditional assessments, then, tend to reveal only the tip of the iceberg 

 (Ingram et al . 1984). Other questions might have been considered prior to 

 initiating the administrative process for setting a flow regime for the river. 

 It would have been helpful, for example, for the Department of Fisheries to 

 generate information about the ways in which the other organizations, 

 especially the Department of Ecology and the City of Seattle, had interacted 



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