This process emphasizes bargaining strategies and negotiation as a way to 

 "cut a deal" among the parties so that, at least in the long run, each relevant 

 and "legitimate" organizational actor obtains something it desired. The 

 legitimacy of a participant is determined primarily by law and custom. Coali- 

 tions among organizations are formed to influence the outcome, but these 

 interests may have little in common except for the support of a particular 

 distributive action. With regard to instream flows, for example, this type 

 activity occurs in lobbying efforts by various groups to, first of all, build 

 a reservoir to hold water for release in dry periods, and then to influence 

 the way in which that water is ultimately distributed (Lowi 1972; Doerksen and 

 Lamb 1979; Lamb and Lovrich 1985). 



In the regulatory arena however, the decision procedure is quite 

 different. Typically, regulatory decisions are made in a quasi-judicial 

 setting by a decisionmaker authorized to make the decision (Lowi 1972; Ripley 

 and Franklin 1984), referred to here as the arbitrator. The type of arbitrator 

 authorized to make the decision is determined by the laws and issues involved, 

 as well as by the types of groups participating. The Federal Energy Regulatory 

 Commission (FERC), for example, often serves this function in hydroelectric 

 licensing applications. The objective of an arbitrator is to choose from 

 among the proposed alternatives the best solution to the problem at hand. In 

 the regulatory arena also, groups coalesce and compete to have their interests 

 incorporated into the policy process, and they tend to do so on the basis of 

 shared interests and mutual goals. Standards, in the form of pel icy deci sions, 

 result in both decisionmaking arenas, but the procedures and bases for making 

 those decisions differ dramatically in each (Doerksen and Lamb 1979; Lamb and 

 Lovrich 1986). 



The assumption in this paper is that the various organizations involved 

 in instream flow issues tend to have preferences for one arena over the other, 

 depending on the organizational strengths and weaknesses of the organization. 

 The dimension in which these preferences are expressed, however, is one of 

 process rather than substance. These preferences result in specific behavioral 

 patterns that lead to the development of organizational roles. These roles 

 are reinforced by a phenomenon known as organizational process. 



3.3 ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS 



Just as individuals tend to develop personal styles, so do organizations. 

 This is true in part because each organization develops its own unique set of 

 internal processes, upon which it eventually comes to depend. This is referred 

 to as "organizational process." The essence of this view is that it postulates 

 the existence of organizational routines and programs that shape internal 

 decisionmaking processes (Cyert and Marsh 1963; Allison 1969, 1971; Mosher and 

 Harr 1970; Sharkansky 1970). The idea is that since organizations have goals, 

 which require planning and coordination, standard operating procedures (SOP's) 

 develop within the organization to help it systematically achieve its goals. 

 SOP's are typical methods for dealing with organizational goals and programs 

 that an organization creates early on and that become entrenched over time 

 (Allison 1969, 1971). 



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