organizational pride and morale. Without them, organizational functions could 

 not be decentralized and delegated with any confidence in consistency. 

 Organizational behavior is thus highly predictable, particularly in response 

 to new values that pose a potential threat to organizational goals, power, or 

 survival (Seidman 1970). Using the context of "roles" developed within LIAM, 

 organizational behavior patterns peculiar to instream flow issues thus can be 

 identified, and predictions made about both the interactions that occur among 

 the organizations and organizational influence on outcome. 



3.5 BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS 



Most natural resource decisions are the result of conflict, competition, 

 and compromise between officials and organizations with diverse interests and 

 unequal abilities to influence the outcome. Variously labeled "partisan 

 mutual adjustment" (Lindblom 1965) and "bureaucratic politics" (Allison 1969, 

 1971; Allison and Halperin 1971), in this process, adversary bargaining is the 

 rule (Ingram 1972, 1984). 



Whenever a decision is the result of compromise, the chosen alternative 

 will tend to benefit many goals somewhat, but maximize none totally. The way 

 to understand a decision, in this view, is to discover the elements that are 

 involved in the bargaining that precedes it; or if the desire is to maximize 

 the amount of influence one has, the objective is to be able to predict the 

 ways in which intergroup bargaining will occur. If bargaining power is 

 concentrated in one group or set of groups, for example, the decision that 

 emerges will reflect those organizations' separate and mutual goals to a 

 higher degree than those of other organizations involved. The more influential 

 organizations, in short, have a proportionately greater impact on policy 

 outcomes (Doerksen and Lamb 1979; Lamb and Lovrich 1986). 



In a study by Beckett and Lamb (1976), evidence was found for the opera- 

 tion of this process in instream flow decisions. These authors observed the 

 prevalence of bargaining among organizations as a means to achieve policy. 

 The art of instream flow politics, then, is the ability to get things done in 

 such a context — and to predict the moves of the other players. In the process 

 of mutual adjustment that usually occurs, the outcome is heavily dependent on 

 the relative abilities of participants to operate effectively and influence 

 the outcome. This involves power. 



3.6 POWER 



Power has long been a topic of interest to those researching administra- 

 tive behavior and influence (Long 1949; Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Simon 1957b; 

 Wildavsky 1979). According to Bachrach and Lawler (1981), power is the 

 "essence of bargaining" and the key to understanding policy decisions made in 

 a climate of mutual accommodation. 



Some researchers have examined power as a function of hierarchical 

 bargaining ability, i.e., as a function of the position of an organization in 

 the institutional hierarchy in which it is located (Dahl and indblom 1953; 



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