behavior and contributes to the development and persistence of organizational 

 roles. 



Four role types are postulated to characterize behavior in natural 

 resource management issues: broker, arbitrator, advocate, and guardian 

 (Beckett and Lamb 1976; Doerksen and Lamb 1979; Lamb and Lovrich 1985). These 

 are represented as opposite extremes of two different behavioral dimensions. 

 That is, organizational behavior is predicted to occur in two distinct 

 dimensions, each of which results from a set of organizational preferences. 

 The first dimension concerns the procedural preferences that shape organiza- 

 tional behavior, and stems from the preferences that organizations have for 

 the arena in which an issue is to be decided. Thus, organizational behavior 

 in this dimension can be viewed as occurring along a continuum, with two 

 opposite role types located at each end. The two roles associated with this 

 preference are labeled in LIAM as "broker" and "arbitrator" (Figure 3). 



Broker Role Type 



Generally speaking, a broker is an organization that combines two 

 characteristics. First, it has some sort of physical control over natural 

 resource systems, allowing it to physically control the allocation of water; 

 and second, it possesses a highly political nature. A broker prefers solutions 

 that spread the benefits to be derived from a decision around so as to satisfy 

 as many interests as possible, or in a way that maintains its own power base. 

 An extreme broker prefers to make the decision itself by compromise, bargain- 

 ing, and coalition building. Less extreme players located along this continuum 

 may not actually broker the decision, but prefer a bargained solution nonethe- 

 less. A broker is thus in a position to support either environmental or 

 developmental interests. It is heavily influenced by political facts or 

 expressions of support from higher authorities and cost-benefit information 

 that demonstrates how the benefits to be derived from a proposed course of 

 action can be divided among the parties. Brokers tend to push for negotiated 

 solutions as a means to achieve results and to satisfy as many of the players 

 as possible. Consensus is preferred. Examples of organizations of this type 

 include the offices of State governors. State legislatures, some planning 

 divisions within the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, many politically created 

 citizens boards and some State water allocation agencies (Beckett and Lamb 

 1976; Doerksen and Lamb 1979; Lamb 1980a; Lamb and Lovrich 1986). 



Of course, not all organizations that prefer the brokered or distributive 

 decisionmaking arena are brokers themselves, but may be closely tied to broker 

 organizations or just prefer "brokered" decisions. For example, the group may 

 have had a long-term and mutually beneficial relationship with the broker in 

 charge of a particular decision outcome. Or the group may simply prefer a 

 brokered decision in one instance because of political favors owed to it by 

 other players or because of the type of power that it has. Organizations do 

 prefer a certain type of procedure for decisionmaking, however, even if the 

 organization is unable to make the decision itself. 



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