Arbitrator Role Type 



Arbitrators prefer an entirely different type of decisionmaking process. 

 An arbitrator usually has statutory authority to promulgate flow regimes or 

 the ability to legally control the allocation of water. Thus, it generally 

 presides over a judicial or quasi-judicial process and determines the ultimate 

 policy outcome itself, based on the adversarial presentation of technical or 

 scientific information. This information is presented by the opposing sides 

 of a conflict to persuade the arbitrator to accept their respective positions. 

 Arbitrators tend to solicit such information from all sides of a conflict, in 

 an effort to reach an "objective" decision. Examples of organizations of this 

 type include: State and Federal courts, the Federal Energy Regulatory 

 Commission (FERC), some State engineers, and some permitting elements of the 

 Environmental Protection Agency (Beckett and Lamb 1976; Doerksen and Lamb 

 1979; Lamb 1980a; Lamb and Lovrich 1986). 



As was the case with brokers, not all organizations actually "arbitrate" 

 an outcome. But some organizations tend to prefer this process over the 

 other, and organizational behavior results from this preference. Figure 3 

 illustrates how these preferences might be characterized in an instream flow 

 conflict when preference for decision arena alone is considered. As can be 

 seen, four organizations are arrayed along the Broker-Arbitrator continuum. 

 Both a State legislature and a water conservancy district are located in the 

 upper half of the diagram; however, the State legislature is farther out on 

 the continuum, indicating a more extreme preference for a brokered decision, 

 perhaps because the State legislature in this instance is the decisionmaker. 

 The water conservancy district also prefers a brokered result, although to a 

 less extreme degree. Once again, perhaps this is because of its political 

 ties to the State legislature or its ability to influence election outcomes 

 within that body. In the lower half of the diagram, the Federal Energy 

 Regulatory Commission lies at the more extreme end of the continuum. Being a 

 classic arbitrator, FERC strongly prefers to have the decision made within its 

 own domain. A State department of game, however, is rarely in a position to 

 actually arbitrate a decision. Yet, because of its data-collection routines, 

 it prefers to operate in a situation where an arbitrator, such as FERC, is in 

 charge, and where it is likely to have the most influence. 



The second behavioral dimension is also one of preference, but, in this 

 case, the preference is for the actual outcome, and thus is closely related to 

 an organization's traditional values or mission. The two roles associated 

 with this dimension, "advocate" and "guardian," are located at opposite ends 

 of the horizontal axis in Figure 4 (Beckett and Lamb 1976; Doerksen and Lamb 

 1979; Lamb 1980a; Lamb and Lovrich 1986). The same element of degree comes 

 into play along this continuum, i.e., the farther out on the continuum an 

 organization is located, the more extreme is the indicated role. 



Advocate Role Type 



An advocate is an intensely ideological, prochange, and usually environ- 

 mentalist organization. It actively seeks to alter the traditional (typically 

 prodevelopment) ways in which National resources have been used and managed. 

 It may be prepared to operate and exert influence in either the distributive 



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